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I. Introduction
Business measures against corruption represent the bulwark
against bribery and other corruption offences in most upper-
income jurisdictions.' Businesses take these measures in response
to the incentives legislation, executive regulations, and other
rulemaking provides to them. 2 As early as 1980, scholars
documented the effect that anti-corruption law-and specifically
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-has had on encouraging
businesses to adopt changes to their accounting and compliance
programs.' Anti-corruption laws have had an impact on the
measures businesses take to prevent, detect, and curb corruption
committed by their agents and partners.4  These measures-in
turn-significantly affect the extent of corruption committed by
companies' principals, agents, and partners.5 Yet, Hong Kong
companies do not implement many of the common measures used
I The Organization for Economic Co-operation Development ("OECD") provides
detailed analysis, even from non-OECD jurisdictions like Singapore, of the various ways
that the corporate sector serves as the primary agent responsible for preventing,
detecting, and responding to corruption before law enforcement even becomes involved.
See 6th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and Pacific, Sing, Nov. 26-28,
2008, Strategies for Business, Government, and Civil Society to Fight Corruption in Asia
and the Pacific, 36, 67, 71, 174, 176, 190.
2 See id.
3 See Michael W. Maher, The Impact of Regulation on Controls: Firms' Response
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 56 THE ACCT. REv. 751, 751-68 (1981).
4 See id. at 768.
5 Several papers have outlined the effects these company programs have had on
corruption. For example, Wu (2005) finds-using regression analysis on cross-country
data from a number of countries (including Hong Kong)-important statistically
significant effects of corporate governance arrangements on corruption. See Xun Wu,
Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis, 18 GOVERNANCE
151, 168-69 (2005) ("The empirical results here support a theoretical projection that
good corporate governance can lead to reduced level of corruption.").
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to prevent and/or detect.' As shown in this paper, Hong Kong's
companies rank among the worst in terms of implementing anti-
corruption measures.7 Most of the blame falls on Hong Kong's
legislative framework (and the lack of incentives this framework
provides).
Hong Kong's Legislative Council ("LegCo") should pass a set
of provisions, found in most upper-income countries, which
provide strong incentives for companies to adopt internal policies
and programs aimed at preventing, detecting, and sanctioning
corruption. In the first section, we review the international "law"
in place that incentivizes companies to adopt anti-corruption
measures.' The second section shows how specific countries (we
focus on the United States) have adopted these principles into their
domestic legislation.o The third section provides an overview of
anti-corruption measures taken by Hong Kong companies and
demonstrates the need for a more activist policy approach to fight
corporate corruption tacitly or directly condoned by Hong Kong's
companies. " In the fourth section, we describe how the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance ("POBO") could introduce a
"business measures defense" similar to the approach taken in U.S.
and U.K. anti-corruption legislation. 12 The following sections
provide recommendations for policy changes that would
encourage the development of anti-corruption business measures
by business associations (fifth section) in financial accounting and
auditing (sixth section) through corporate whistleblowing (seventh
section) and internal investigations (eighth section) by business
partners (ninth section), through public disclosure (tenth section),
and training (eleventh section)." In the penultimate section, we
discuss how the Ethics Development Centre can play a stronger
role in encouraging companies to adopt anti-corruption business
6 See infra Section IV.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See infra Section II. We put the word law in quotes as such law consists of non-
binding guidelines and soft law norms as promulgated by the U.N. and the OECD.
10 See infra Section III.
II See infra Section IV.
12 See infra Section V.
13 See infra Sections VI-XII.
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measures. 4 The final section concludes."
II. International Law and Corporate Measures Aimed at
Reducing Corruption
International law provides little guidance on the specific
measures companies should take to tackle corruption. The United
Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 ("UNCAC")
provides only the most general framework to legislators as they
decide on the types of laws they need to adopt in order to
encourage companies to adopt effective anti-corruption measures
(and we define some of these measures below)." Article 12 of the
UNCAC concerns private sector measures aimed at fighting
corruption, and outlines three areas of action." These three areas
include company anti-corruption programs, accounting standards,
and penalties." Specifically, the UNCAC asks parties (and their
legislatures who pass the legislation aimed at adopting the
Convention's provisions) "to prevent corruption involving the
private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the
private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective,
proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative, or criminal
penalties for failure to comply with such measures.""
The UNCAC provides a bit more clarification as to the type of
measures businesses should take to fight corruption, but not much.
Figure 1 shows the provisions from Article 12.2 of the Convention
(which outlines specific measures private sector bodies should take
to tackle corruption).20 The UNCAC encourages several of the
business measures often associated with fighting corruption, yet
conspicuously omits others.2 ' The UNCAC cites the important
14 See infra Section XIII.
15 See infra Section XIV.
16 See infra Section II.
17 United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 12, Oct. 31, 2003, 43 I.L.M.
37.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See infra Figure 1.
21 Some commentators note that these measures miss the point of private measures
aimed at reducing corruption. Berger and Holland (2006) in particular, argue that the
private sector's main role in fighting corruption consists of pressuring governments in
civil courts to reduce political and administrative corruption. See Ethan Burger & Mary
Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight
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roles of codes of conduct and standards (Art. 12.2.b), internal
audits (Art. 12.2.fJ), accounting standards (Art. 12.3), and
whistleblowing programs (Art. 33).22 However, the UNCAC is
conspicuously silent on business partner oversight and anti-
corruption training/education in the private sector.2 3 The UNCAC
basically defines the ends (or goals) of member state legislation: to
"take measures ... to prevent corruption involving the private
sector... ."24 Member states themselves determine how best to
achieve that goal.25
Figure 1: Business Measures Outlined in the UNCAC
Item of the Convention Article Potential res onses
"Promoting cooperation
between law
enforcement agencies
and
relevant private entities"
"Promoting the
development of
standards and
procedures... including
codes of conduct"
"Promoting transparency
among private entities"
12.2.a Community policing and
regulatory investigation
(corporations' own internal
investigations).
12.2.b Codes of conduct at the business
association and individual
company level.
12.2.c. Encourages transparency in
corporate reporting (and has led
to global initiatives aimed at
standardizing types of anti-
corruption information to
disclose).
Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 45, 50-51 (2006).
22 The Convention neither explicitly gives nor limits private sector participation in
such programs. The article encourages Parties to adopt "appropriate measures to provide
protection against any unjustified treatment for any person" (presumably public or
private) who has made a corruption-related report to "the competent authorities."
Competent authorities presumably may also include corporate authorities-though
different legal systems (and scholars) may interpret such authorities differently. United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 17.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 See id. ("Each State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the
fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prevent corruption involving the private
sector . . . .").
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"Ensuring that private
enterprises... have
sufficient internal
auditing controls"
"maintenance of books
and records, financial
statement disclosures
and accounting and
auditing standards"
"appropriate measures to
provide protection
against any unjustified
treatment for any person
who reports in good faith
and on reasonable
grounds"
12.2.f. Deals with accounting and
auditing standards largely under
self-regulating associations and
professional organizations.
12.3 Accounting and audit standards
33 Encourages whistleblower
protection programs (in both
public and private sectors).
*We do not look at controls on public officials who regulate the private sector
as our paper focuses on business measures aimed at fighting corruption. We
omit sections 12.3 and 12.4 of the Convention as largely irrelevant to our
discussion.
What about companies (and countries) looking for more
specific guidance about specific anti-corruption business
measures? The Organization for Economic Co-operation
Development's guidelines point to the direction of likely
legislation by upper-income jurisdictions (like Hong Kong)
seeking to encourage businesses to take adequate measures to
deter corruption.2 6 Figure 2 shows the twelve main aspects of
corporate behavior likely to represent the focus of increased
rulemaking in the upcoming years.27 In layperson's language,
26 See OECD, Working Group on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Int'l Bus.
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions [hereinafter "OECD Guidelines"],
at Annex 11 (Nov. 26, 2009) (amended Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.oecd
.org/daf/anti-bribery/4417691 0.pdf.
27 We use company and corporation interchangeably in our report since the likely
targets of such rulemaking would be large corporations who represent large bribery risks
(and can comply with increased anti-corruption regulating). We naturally appreciate that
the corporate form of business organization presents certain types of agency and
corporate governance issues which do not arise in other forms of business organization.
For more on the way that corporate structure may affect a company's propensity to bribe,
see George Clarke & Lixin Xu, Ownership, Competition, and Corruption: Bribe Takers
versus Bribe Payers, 2783 WORLD BANK POL'Y RES. WORKING PAPER (Feb. 2002).
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these rules are likely to focus on increasing management's support
for anti-corruption control (recommendation one), a clear policy
against bribery (recommendation two), and a duty held at all levels
of the corporation to prevent or reduce corruption
(recommendation three). Other elements consist of setting up
independent oversight of corporate behavior (recommendation
four), setting up and enforcing compliance programs
(recommendations five, six, eight, ten, eleven, and twelve), and
having proper accounting practices (recommendation seven).
Figure 2: OECD Recommended Business Measures for
Internal Control and Compliance for Companies"
1. senior management support for the company's anti-corruption internal
controls;
2. a clear "policy [against] foreign bribery";
3. clear "duty . .. at all levels" to comply with anti-corruption policies;
4. set up independent oversight ("such as internal audit committees of
boards of directors or of supervisory boards");
5. "compliance program[]s ... applicable to all entities over which a
company has effective control, including subsidiaries [which control],
inter alia, the following areas: gifts; hospitality, entertainment and
expenses; customer travel; political contributions; charitable
donations .. .; facilitation payments; and solicitation and extortion
[payments]";
6. "properly documented risk-based due diligence" of business partners
and the company's compliance program;
7. "a system of financial and accounting procedures [which ensures] the
maintenance of fair and accurate books, records, and accounts [which]
cannot be used for the purpose of foreign bribery or hiding such
bribery";
8. "periodic communication, and documented training, for all levels of
the company, on the company's . . . compliance program[]";
9. [omitted due to general nature];
10. "appropriate disciplinary procedures to address . . . foreign bribery";
11. "providing guidance and advice" on complying with the company's
compliance program, including when they need urgent advice,
whistleblowing, and taking "appropriate action in response to
[whistleblowing] reports";
12. "periodic reviews of.. . compliance program[s]."
28 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 26, at Annex II § A.
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Even if jurisdictions like Hong Kong slavishly adopt the
OECD's guidelines, the initial evidence suggests that many
business measures have little effect in reducing corruption. In one
of the most comprehensive studies in its field, Carr and Outhwaite
looked at the extent to which international companies adopted
many of the commonly accepted measures aimed at preventing
corruption. 29 Figure 3 shows the proportion of companies Carr
and Outhwaite surveyed that adopted various anti-corruption
measures as well as the percent of respondents who thought those
measures provided highly effective methods of preventing
corruption. 30 They found that only five activities are widely
perceived as effective among businesspersons in reducing
corruption (namely that more than 40% of their sample think
work). " These measures include internal audit and financial
statement disclosure, anti-corruption measures aimed at suppliers,
the in-house monitoring of those measures, and penalties for
breaching the company's anti-corruption policies.32 As we shall
see later, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act provides strong
incentives for businesses to adopt these measures.
Figure 3: Existing Law Has a Weak (though Positive) Effect
on Encouraging Businesses to Adopt Measures Aimed at
Reducing Corruption
(items in grey not widely perceived as effective)
Business Measure Aimed at Reducing Percent Percent
Corruption adoption highly
effective
Internal Audit 80% 150%
29 Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, Corruption and Business Integrity: Law, Policy
and Company Practices, 6 MANCHESTER J. INT'L EcoN L. 16, 54 (2009). Other surveys
measure the extent of adoption of various business measures aimed at preventing
corruption. However, these surveys lack critical assessment and the objectivity of the
academic peer-review process. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, Driving Ethical Growth -
New Markets, New Challenges: 11th Global Fraud Survey, http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/Driving ethicalgrowth_newmarkets,_new_challenges: I It
hGlobalFraud_Survey/$FILE/EY 11thGlobalFraudSurvey.pdf.
30 Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 29, at 54.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See infra Section 111.
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External Audit 85% 30%
Appointment of Compliance officers 55% 30%
Involvement of independent non-EDs 70% 25%
Composition of Board 60% 35%
Vetting of personnel 65% 35%
Compliance into HR 35% 20%
Financial statement disclosure 75% 45%
Pay (wage) policies 70% 35%
Promotion policies 60% 40%
Director's shareholdings 75% 40%
Anti-corruption provisions for 70% 50%
suppliers
In-house supplier monitoring 75% 60%
Penalties for breach of AC policies 70% 60%
Hotlines 80% 40%
Monitoring by NGO 5% 0%
Monitoring by industry body 25% 20%
Figures have been rounded to the nearest 5% (the most meaningful level of
rounding given the imprecision of these data). We have deemed activities not
widely perceived as effective with less than 40% rate of efficacy.
Current trends in international lawmaking (and the data which
reflect on those trends) provide three lessons for jurisdictions, like
Hong Kong, seeking to strengthen business measures against
corruption. First, most legislatures should focus on the ends of
lawmaking (preventing corruption) while leaving the types of
programs companies implement up to the companies themselves.3 4
Second, more specific lawmaking (such as adopting the OECD's
guidelines through administrative rulemaking) seems unlikely -
given the lack of certainty that these provisions actually reduce
corruption." According to Carr and Outhwaite's data, only 20%
of respondents think that a measure (which most people
mistakenly think works)-namely, monitoring by industry
bodies-actually works. Third, more specific guidance probably
will not come from organizations like the OECD or the U.N. any
time soon. Article 12 of UNCAC and the OECD's guidelines
34 Id. at 42-43.
35 Id. at 48.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 37 (stating that companies perceive non-governmental organizations
to be of little relevance).
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remain general and vague.38 The vague nature of advice given by
international organizations probably reflects a lack of empirical
evidence that shows that particular measures work better than
others. Given this lack of guidance, countries will need to decide
for themselves how to encourage their companies to adopt
effective measures aimed at reducing corruption.
III.Legal Measures Encouraging the Use of Business Measures
in Various Jurisdictions (and especially the United
Kingdom and United States)
Four approaches describe the differences in the ways that
national legislation provides incentives for companies to adopt
internal anti-corruption programs. Figure 4 provides an overview
of these four approaches-the no regulation approach, the
methods-based approach, the results-based approach, and the self-
regulating approach. 9 We also provide examples of countries
adopting each method. No obvious pattern explains differences in
the ways various legislatures encourage companies to adopt anti-
corruption measures.
Figure 4: Four Approaches to Legislating/Regulating
Business Measures Against Corruption
No regulation Most jurisdictions. Corruption focuses on natural
approach persons and so legislation provides no incentives for
companies to protect themselves.
Examples: Hong Kong*, Singapore, and most
developing-world jurisdictions
Methods- Provides a prescriptive list of programs companies
based must have in place.
approach Examples: none so far (except for state-owned
companies). China likely to follow this approach.
Results-based Offers companies prosecuted for isolated cases of
38 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 17.
39 See Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REv. 949, 951,
961-62, 965, 1013 (laying out taxonomy of the four methods). We slightly simplify the
Hong Kong case. Legislation provides some liability of companies (in theory) by
identifying companies themselves with their corrupt controlling persons and/or making
them vicariously liable. However, such an indirect route does not compare with the
direct liability faced by their U.S./U.K. brethren.
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approach corruption with a defense for having anti-corruption
compliance programs in place.
Examples: United Kingdom and United States
Self- Focuses on business industries to self-regulate.
regulating Examples: Most of OECD (ex-United States and ex-
approach United Kingdom).
Most jurisdictions do not provide any kind of legislative-
mandated incentives for companies to adopt anti-corruption
measures. In the case of Hong Kong, the POBO's focus on natural
persons rather than legal persons makes such compliance programs
relatively unnecessary.40 In the case of Singapore's Prevention of
Corruption Act, similar wording to the POBO refers to "a
person." 4' Because corruption focuses on offences committed by
natural persons, most anti-corruption laws worldwide do not
define specific offences against legal persons. Those jurisdictions
where corporate criminality exists (Switzerland, Belgium, and
others) tend to treat corruption like any other crime and make
companies and natural persons culpable. 42 Legislation (or
regulation governing the prosecution of corruption offences)
provides no specific defenses for company anti-corruption
compliance programs.
No jurisdiction we know of currently uses a methods-based
approach to regulate business measures aimed at reducing
corruption (by providing a prescriptive list of measures businesses
must take to prevent corruption). Notable exceptions come from
state-owned enterprises and other business entities operating under
executive and/or civil service regulations. 43 Anti-corruption
40 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201, 2-3, § 2 (2003) (H.K.). The
ordinance refers to "any person" in most of the articles. The plain meaning of the
Ordinance suggests that a person refers to natural persons and not legal persons.
However, the lack of corporate prosecutions suggests that such persons (in practice) refer
to natural persons.
41 Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap. 241, § 1 (2012) (Sing).
42 See generally Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory, Corporate Criminal Liability, in
GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 625, 625-55 (Karen Brown & David Snyder eds., 2012) (describing
the differences in the ways various jurisdictions treat corporate culpability).
43 See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Program, CROATIA CONTROL LTD., http://www.croc
ontrol.hr/Default.aspx?sec=l 84 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (providing examples of state-
owned companies that create anti-corruption compliance programs in complying with
regulations).
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compliance programs in government-owned or managed
companies usually come from action plans developed on the
authority of a strategy promulgated by the head of government.4 4
For example, as of November 26, 2009, the Croatian Anti-
Corruption Strategy and Action Plan requires all state owned
companies to devise their own anti-corruption compliance
programs. 45  Croatia Control Ltd.-a state owned company-
provides an example available to the reader on the Internet. 46 The
company provides air navigation, air traffic services,
communication, navigation and surveillance, aeronautical
information, and aeronautical meteorological services. 47 Bound by
administrative law, the enterprise must adopt the same kinds of
anti-corruption compliance activities as other public sector bodies.
Croatia serves as the example we want to focus on because the
country has been one of the most vigorous in adopting anti-
corruption advice from the E.U., U.N., and Council of Europe.48
Croatia's work in this area may represent early adoption of similar
administrative measures.
Both the United Kingdom and United States have strongly
adopted a results-based approach to regulating business anti-
corruption methods. Neither the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act ("FCPA") nor the United Kingdom's Bribery Act of 2010
("UKBA") define specific business measures companies should
take. 49 However, they both provide strong incentives for
companies to implement anti-corruption compliance programs.o
Both pieces of legislation create these incentives by allowing for
the existence of compliance programs and other business measures
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. Research on comparative administrative law (in anti-corruption and other
areas of administrative action against corruption in state-managed companies) proves
exceedingly difficult as most governments do not post executive regulations or
administrative decrees and decisions on the internet. We chose the Croatian example as
a publicly visible example of an extremely widespread administrative practice.
47 Core Business, CROATIA CONTROL LTD., http://www.crocontrol.hr/
Default.aspx?sec=109 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). -
48 Id.
49 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-ff (1998); Bribery
Act 2010, 2010, c. 23, §§ 1-20, schs. 1, 2 (U.K.).
50 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-ff (1998); Bribery
Act 2010, 2010, c. 23, §§ 1-20, schs. 1, 2 (U.K.).
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against corruption as a defense if a company faces prosecution for
the corruption of its agents." In the U.S. case, the Department of
Justice takes the existence of compliance programs into account
during prosecution, as provided for by Corporate Charging
Guidelines (which we discuss in more detail later in this paper).5 2
In the U.K., companies may specifically rely on provisions in the
UKBA, which makes having "adequate procedures" (namely a
compliance program) a defense at trial. " Rational corporate
directors would adopt these business measures as a type of
insurance that they can call upon in the event their company faces
prosecution for corruption. We now look at the specific provisions
in both sets of legislation that encourage U.S. and U.K. companies
to adopt internal anti-corruption programs.
While the FCPA does not define specific measures that
companies should take, a series of subsidiary rulemakings
provides more guidance. The Corporate Charging Guidelines, in
particular, define the set of factors prosecutors should keep in
mind when the Department of Justice decides whether to bring
charges and/or seek a specific settlement during a deferred (or
non-) prosecution agreement.54 Specifically related to compliance
programs, these factors include:
1. "the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,"
including managerial complicity;ss
2. the corporation's "disclosure of wrongdoing" and
"willingness to cooperate"56;
3. the "existence and effectiveness" of the corporation's
compliance program;"
4. "the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
51 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-ff (1998); Bribery
Act 2010, 2010, c. 23, §§ 1-20, schs. 1, 2 (U.K.).
52 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-28 (2008).
53 Indira Carr, Development, Business Integrity and the UK Bribery Act 2010, in
MODERN BRIBERYLAW (Jeremy Horder & Peter Alldridge eds., 2013).
54 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at § 9-28.3.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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cooperate with the relevant government agencies."ss
An anti-corruption program that incorporates many of the
elements we previously discussed (namely the measures outlined
in Figure 3) provides a defense during prosecution in a number of
ways. First, anti-corruption measures taken by companies are
likely to lead to a decrease in the "[p]ervasiveness of [w]rongdoing
[w]ithin the [c]orporation."s" Individual cases of bribery and other
corruption may occur for reasons beyond the control of corporate
managers. However, such anti-corruption programs would reduce
the likelihood that such corruption extends beyond isolated cases.
Second, specific provisions related to internal audit promote "the
corporation's ... disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to
cooperate.""o Compliance programs generally contain provisions
related to corporate actions during regulatory investigations and
may also include policies for self-reporting."
Certain types of compliance programs received favorable
treatment by U.S. prosecutors (or become required as part of
agreements). In their review of twelve prosecutions of FCPA
violations, Mr. Finder and his colleagues found several common
business measures companies undertook to decrease prosecution.62
Figure 5 shows the most common business measures that the U.S.
Department of Justice required companies to take during their non-
or deferred prosecution agreement talks. Most of these nine points
repeat many of the measures we have already mentioned.
However, they have received the U.S. Department of Justice's
stamp of approval as anti-corruption business measures.6 3 Thus-
in the United States at least-companies should consider these
nine business measures as necessary measures for helping to
deflect a corruption-related prosecution.'
58 Id.
59 Id. at § 9-28.5.
6o DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at § 9-28.3.
61 For a discussion of the way that self-reporting policies may assist a company
prosecuted for violations of the FCPA, see Gary Spratling, Detection and Deterrence:
Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 798 (2001).
62 See Lawrence Finder, Ryan McConnell & Scott Mitchell, Betting the
Corporation: Compliance or Defiance? Compliance Programs in the Context of Deferred
and Non-Prosecution Agreements (Jan. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1332033.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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Figure 5: Common Business Measures Serving a Partial
Defense Against a FCPA-Related Prosecution6 1
1. Adopt internal accounting, control system, and record retention system, and
"help-Line."
2. Adopt a new corporate policy against bribery and establish compliance
committee on Board.
3. Appoint one or more senior corporate officials who shall report directly to
the Board to oversee compliance.
4. Retain new senior management with understanding of FCPA requirements.
5. Communicate the new procedures to officers and employees through a
revised training program and periodic certifications.
6. Adopt new disciplinary procedures for employees who violate the FCPA.
7. Allow an independent audit of the new compliance program and procedures
by outside counsel and auditors at three-year intervals.
8. Implement procedures designed to ensure that the corporation will not do
business with partners likely to violate the FCPA.
9. Provisions in contracts designed to prevent FCPA violations including the
right to conduct audit of partners and right to terminate agents/partner for FCPA
issues.
The UKBA, on the other hand, has paradoxically provided
more explicit and less explicit guidance on the types of business
measures companies should undertake to prevent and otherwise
frustrate corruption committed by its agents. " However, the
UKBA (specifically the Ministry of Justice) provides less explicit
guidance than the FCPA. On the other hand, the companies
looking to defend themselves from prosecution under the UKBA
have far more explicit guidance than their American counterparts
had one year after the adoption of the FCPA.6 ' The Ministry's
Guidance provides six explicit principles used when assessing
whether a company's anti-corruption compliance program
provides "adequate measures" for deterring corruption. 69 As
shown in Figure 6, the UKBA also provides specific policies and
procedures companies can put in place to follow each of these
principles.
Figure 6 shows that the Ministry of Justice provides companies
with a wide range of (mostly cosmetic) business measures. Many
65 Id.
66 See Bribery Act, supra note 49, § 9.
67 See id.
68 See Bribery Act, supra note 49, § 9.
69 Id.
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of these measures include pronouncements and trainings.
Figure 6: The Six Principles and Related Business Measures
Available as a Defense to Companies under the UKBA
Guidance
Principle Policies and/or Procedures
Proportionate
Procedures70
Top Level
Commitment7
Commitment to bribery prevention, a general
approach to mitigation of specific bribery risks, an
overview of its strategy to implement its bribery
prevention policies, risk assessment procedures,
due diligence on existing or prospective associated
persons, a policy on gifts, policies on direct and
indirect employment, adequate bookkeeping,
auditing and approval of expenditure, separation of
functions and the avoidance of conflicts of interest,
a policy on information disclosure, disciplinary
procedures and sanctions for breaches of the
organization's anti-bribery rules, whistle- blowing
procedures.
Management's communication of the
organization's anti-bribery policies, personal
involvement in developing bribery prevention
procedures as well as written and/or verbal
statements that the company has a commitment to
carry out business fairly, honestly and openly, zero
tolerance towards bribery, a statement that the
company will punish employees, managers and
associated persons for violating the company's anti-
corruption policies. Managers should also state the
benefits of rejecting bribery, make public
declarations about the work the company does to
prevent corruption, mention key people and/or
departments responsible for tackling corruption,
and mention the company's work in collective anti-
corruption efforts (like in business associations).
Other work should include selecting and training
senior managers to lead anti-bribery work, leading
code of conduct work, endorsing all bribery
prevention related publications, ensuring effective
70 Id. at 20-22.
71 Id. at 23-24.
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dissemination of anti-bribery policies and
procedures to employees, subsidiaries, and
associated persons.
Risk Company risk assessment procedures and practices
Assessment 72  will usually have over-sight by top management,
appropriate resourcing, proper information sources,
conduct of due diligence enquiries and appropriate
documentation of risk assessment practices.
Due Diligence7 Conducting risk assessments and due diligent
(based on risk) on persons associated with the
company or performing services for the company.
On-going information collection may be required.
Communication Communications about policies, establishment of
(including hotlines, statements, codes of conduct, information
training) 74  on bribery prevention policies, training on anti-
corruption policies for higher corruption risk areas,
for new employees and associates.
Monitoring & Financial control systems, staff surveys, annual
Review75  reports, compliance with anti-bribery standards.
IV. The Current State of Play in Hong Kong Companies'
Adoption of Corporation Measures
Hong Kong's businesses, by all measures, play a far less
important role in preventing corruption than their peers in other
upper-income countries.7 ' According to a Factiva search of anti-
corruption conferences, codes of conduct, and/or regulations
focused at business associations, Hong Kong had only seven
media citations. This number equals less than half of those for
China and only about five percent of citations coming from the
United States. In practice, as shown below, Hong Kong's
professional and business associations spend far less time
encouraging their members to adopt anti-corruption provisions
72 Id.at 25-26.
73 Id. at 27-28.
74 BRIBERY ACT, supra note 49, at 29-30.
75 Id. at 31.
76 See infra Figure 7.
77 We used the search terms "anti-corruption conference" or "code of conduct" or
"anti-corruption" and "Hong Kong."
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than business associations in other countries.7 ' As a result, far
fewer Hong Kong companies have codes of conduct and/or other
measures aimed at curbing corruption."
Compared with other countries, Hong Kong's large companies
have relatively undeveloped business measures aimed at
preventing corruption. Figure 7 shows scores given by
Transparency International to corporations from various
jurisdictions related to the extent that corporations from these
jurisdictions report the existence of anti-corruption measures (like
codes of conduct and/or other measures).so As shown, Canada, the
United States, and the United Kingdom rank among the top five
countries whose companies report pro-active anti-corruption
policies and practices." These countries, as we will see later, also
have some of the most proactive legislative measures aimed at
providing companies with incentives to reduce corruption. Hong
Kong ranks toward the bottom of the list, with its companies
adopting few of the roughly fifty anti-corruption measures
assessed by Transparency International.82
78 See infra Figure 9.
79 See id.
80 Transparency Int'l, Transparency in Reporting on Anti-Corruption, A Report on
Corporate Practices 13 (2009).
81 See infra Figure 7.
82 Specific assessment criteria included the existence (and defined targets) of a
code, membership in various initiatives (like the Global Compact), existence (and clearly
defined targets) of an over-arching anti-corruption policy, specific policies related to
anti-bribery, facilitation payments, gifts, political contributions, charitable donations and
lobbying, systems of managing/monitoring agents, as well as programs related to
training, communication, whistleblowing, internal review, and external audit.
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING ON ANTI-CORRUPTION, A REPORT
ON CORPORATE PRACTICES 23 (2009).
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Figure 7: Hong Kong's Companies Rank Poorly
Internationally in Terms of Corporate Policies Aimed at
Fighting Corruption
30
25
4 20
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Source: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, infra note 269. The scores in the figure refer to
the extent to which companies from that jurisdiction adopt anti-corruption strategies,
policies and management systems (from a 50 point assessment questionnaire). See
source for more.
Several examples illustrate the difference between foreign
companies and Hong Kong companies' anti-corruption policies.
Coca-Cola has a code of conduct and a special hotline dedicated to
taking complaints about bribery and other misconduct." Indeed,
among the top-200 of the Global 500 (the world's largest
international companies), very few companies do not have an anti-
corruption code of conduct or policy." Those that do not have
these codes tend suspiciously to congregate in the oil industry
(Gazprom, Lukoil, Petronas), the financial services industry
(Nippon Life Insurance, Wachovia, Zurich Financial, China Life
Insurance, China Construction Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial),
the retail industry (Auchan, AEON), and about five other various
industries. " Hong Kong's largest companies paint a different
picture. Hutchison Whampoa, the parent company of Hutchinson
Port Holdings, claims to "take[] its anti-corruption responsibilities
very seriously"" and allegedly has an anti-corruption policy.8 1
83 Government & Ethics, THE COCA-COLA Co., http://www.coca-colacompany.
com/our-company/governance-ethics/govemance-ethics (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
84 See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Anti-Corruption Policies and Measures of
the Fortune Global 500 vols. 1-5 (2008).
85 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 80.
86 Operating Practices, HUTCHINSON PORT HOLDINGS TRUST, http://www.hph
trust.com/csr-operating.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
87 Operating Practices, HUTCHINSON-WHAMPOA, http://www.hutchison-
whampoa.com/en/esg/operating.php#antibribery (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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The company provides no evidence of either statement." The Li
& Fung Group does better, providing a statement against bribery
and corruption in its code of conduct." CLP Holdings Ltd. has a
fraud statement, which buries a mention about corruption and
bribery as forms of bribery. 90 Anti-corruption policies and
measures have not spread even among the less revenue-rich (but
more well-known companies). 91 Ocean Park, for example, only
has a simple three-line policy statement, though also provides a
hotline number.92
More rigorous evidence shows that most Hong Kong
companies do not even have basic codes of conduct or statements
of principles against corruption. Figure 8 shows the percent of
companies participating in the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered
Secretaries survey that have various provisions in their codes of
conduct.9 3 Only 52% of the companies they surveyed even had
codes of conduct.94 Of the 52%, most have anti-bribery provisions
(specifically admonitions against accepting or asking for an
advantage).95 Roughly 80% of the companies that have a code of
conduct also included admonitions against conflicts of interest."
Only about half of the codes defined any kind of reporting
channels in case breaches of code occurred.97 This data reflects
the lack of incentives for Hong Kong companies to adopt such
codes of conduct.
88 Id.
89 LI & FUNG,CODE OF CONDUCT AND BUSINESS ETHICS 2-3 (August 2012),
available at http://www.lifung.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/LF-Code-of-Conduct-
and-Business-Ethics.pdf.
90 Anti-Fraud Policy, CLP GROUP, https://www.cipgroup.com/ourcompany
/corporategovemance/framework/codespoliciesandguidelines/Documents/AntifraudPolic
yenglish.pdf (last updated July 2009).
91 See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Policy Statement, OCEAN PARK HONG KONG,
http://www.oceanpark.com.hk/html/en/footer/corporate-policy/anti-corruption.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014).
92 See id.
93 H.K. Inst. of Chartered Secretaries & H.K. Shue Yan Univ., Business Ethics: A
Path to Success 15 (2007).
94 Id. at 14.
95 Id. at 15.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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Figure 8: Most Hong Kong Companies Do Not Have Codes of
Conduct Discouraging Bribery
50%
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accepting /asking handing conflict of interest offering an entertainment reporting observing local
for an advantage confidential info advantage channels laws
These data come from 63 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
which responded to a survey administrered
by the authors of the study. Source: HK Institute of Chartered Secretaries (2007).
Other data support the claim that Hong Kong's companies
face few incentives to adopt anti-corruption measures. Figure 9
shows Hong Kong companies' adoption of business ethics
programs compared with the adoption of such programs in other
jurisdictions." In the United States, most companies have some
kind of ethics program, if even a basic one (as defined by the
study's authors).99 In the United Kingdom, in contrast, about half
of the companies with an ethics program have a comprehensive
program covering various aspects of potential corruption and other
wrongdoing."oo Norway, according to these data, probably reflects
the most advanced jurisdiction in terms of providing its companies
with incentives to adopt "advanced" ethics programs.'o Hong
Kong and Singapore, with their laissez-faire traditions of business
regulation, represent jurisdictions that provide their businesses
with few incentives to adopt effective anti-corruption measures.102
98 Ethical Investment Research Services, Corporate Codes of Business Ethics: An
International Survey of Bribery and Ethical Standards in Companies 5 (2005).
99 See infra Figure 9.
100 Id.
10 Id.
102 As we discuss below, both jurisdictions focus liability on the individual rather
than on the corporate entity. The distribution of liability explains in part these
international differences.
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Figure 9: Hong Kong Ranks Second Last on Quality of
Businesses' Ethics Programmes
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The data show the percent of companies in the All-World Developed index from
each country having basic, intermediate and advanced ethics programmes. The
Hong Kong assessment consisted of 102 companies. Source: Corporate Codes
of Business Ethics: An International Survey of Bribery and Ethical Standards in
Companies, ETHICAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH SERVICES 1, 5 (2005), available at
http://www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/corporatecodesofbusinessethic
sep05.pdf.
The lack of business measures has led to undesirable policy
outcomes. Hong Kong's high Transparency International
Perceptions Index scores suggest the effectiveness of anti-
corruption law on the archipelago.o3 However, local experiences
diverge from these international perceptions. 10 4 Figure 10 shows
the number of respondents in a sample of Hong Kong
businesspersons who had a "common" experience with several
types of misconduct."0 More than half of the respondents saw
Conflict of Interest as a common problem. Worryingly, roughly
40% of respondents noted that bribery represented a common
problem in Hong Kong. If the most recent ICAC survey data are
correct, then roughly 40,000 people experienced corruption in
103 See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2012, available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results.
104 See ETHICAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH SERVICES, supra note 98, at 7-9.
los Id.
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201 1.106
Figure 10: Illegal and Unethical Behaviour "Common" in
Hong Kong Business
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Source: Business Ethics: A Path to Success, HK INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED SECRETARIES 1, 8-
10 (2007), available at
http://www.hkics.org.hk/media/publication/attachment/2073_Business%20Ethics.pdf.
These data suggest that Hong Kong's relatively low incidence
of corruption comes despite a lack of incentives provided to
businesses to prevent corruption. Until now, the ICAC's
successful education of the population as a whole has rendered it
unnecessary to reach businesses through their respective business
associations.10 7 In such a low-corruption environment, business
associations have not needed to promulgate these kinds of
regulations, as have their counterparts in countries such as
Germany and the United Kingdom.os Because of the personal,
rather than corporate, liability imposed under current Hong Kong
law, few incentives encourage Hong Kong's businesses to adopt
anti-corruption measures.109 However, a number of factors suggest
that Hong Kong's authorities will need to adopt a more pro-active
approach for encouraging its companies to adopt anti-corruption
106 See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION, ICAC ANNUAL SURVEY
2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15 (2013) (estimating that 1.2% of the territory's four
million residents had personally experienced corruption that year).
107 See infra Section XII.
lol See ETHICAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH SERVICES, supra note 98, at 7-9.
I09 See id.
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measures.o10
Hong Kong's authorities will need to provide stronger
incentives, through pro-active law making, aimed at encouraging
companies to adopt effective anti-corruption measures. First,
closer integration with the mainland has made the previous laissez-
faire policies obsolete. "' Chinese companies increasingly
compete in Hong Kong markets, often against Hong Kong-based
companies.12 In 2011, 640 of the 1,496 companies listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange were headquartered on the
mainland."' These companies represent a market capitalization of
$1.25 trillion, or 55% of the exchange's total valuation.1 4 These
companies face few incentives from mainland law to adopt
measures against corruption. "s Hong Kong law will therefore
need to raise the bar in order for all companies to compete at the
same level. Second, the imposition of liability on companies, as
distinct from natural persons, will provide very strong incentives
for these corporate persons to protect themselves. Once such
legislation appears, Hong Kong companies are certain to seek
guidance on implementing effective measures aimed at
minimizing the risk of bribery prosecution.
V. Introducing a Business Measures Defense into the POBO
Two new innovations in Hong Kong legislation will soon
provide the same incentives for the widespread adoption of anti-
corruption business measures as those found in other upper-
income jurisdictions. "' First, the introduction of corporate
1o See, e.g., Tony Kwok Man-wai, Successful Anti-Corruption Strategy &
International Good Practice, RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES (No. 86) 99, 116 (2012),
available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RSNo89/No89_VE Man-wai.pdf
III See HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, HKEx FACT BOOK 2011 1 (2012), available
at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statrpt/factbook/factbook20 11/Documents/FB_201
i.pdf.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
11s See David Voreacos, China's Bribery Culture Poses Risk for Multinationals,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 21, 2013 (noting that corruption is prevalent and tolerated in China),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/china-s-bribery-culture-poses-risks-for-
multinationals.html.
116 See OECD ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUFIION INIIATIVIE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: THE CRIMINALISATION OF
BRIBERTY IN ASIA ANDI HE PACIFIC 201-02 (2011) (describing the two measures).
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criminal (or even administrative) liability for bribery will
encourage Hong Kong's corporations to adopt anti-corruption
measures." 7  Second, expanded use of vicarious liability"' will
encourage senior managers to use business measures to minimize
their own personal liability."19
Under current Hong Kong law, corporations possess some
degree of liability for corrupt acts committed by their agents, to the
extent corporations may "identify" with their directors or hold
vicarious liability for them. 120 However, the explicit
criminalization of corruption committed by Hong Kong legal
persons would provide strong incentives to Hong Kong directors
to adopt business measures against corruption.
Hong Kong's legislators will need to decide which of the four
traditional measures aimed at encouraging businesses to adopt
measures against corruption to rely on. Figure 11 shows the pros
and cons of each approach.' 2 ' We do not describe the results-
based approach here, but rather later in the section and in greater
depth. The no-regulation approach would basically keep the status
quo. In all likelihood, if the ICAC wanted to pursue companies as
criminally liable for corruption, it would need to test the bench's
indulgence with the various theories of identification and vicarious
liability it might try to introduce through case law.
.' Id. at 201.
I1 See, e.g., HONG KONG'S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW IN CHINA'S HONG KONG 535-37 (Simon N. M. Young & Yash Ghai eds., 2014)
(discussing vicarious liability in the tort context).
119 OECD. ADB/OECD ANI-CORRUIFION INIIIAIVE FOR ASIA AND THE1 PACIFIC THi CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY IN
ASIA AND'I HI PACIFIC. supra notc 116. at 202.
120 See Magistrates Ordinance, Cap. 227, § 87 (1997) (allowing a corporation to be
served with documents and to respond in court via a corporate officer or other
representative); Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221, § 49 (3)-(4) (1997) (allowing
corporation to enter plea via a representative at arraignment); Interpretation and General
Clauses Ordinance, Cap. 1, § 3 (2009) (defining "persons" to include legal as well as
natural persons); see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK& OECD, THE CRIMINALISATION
OF BRIBERY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 165-66 (2011) (discussing the shortcomings of
identification, a currently prevailing common-law doctrine of corporate liability, which
imputes liability to a corporation whose "directing mind" commits a crime), available at
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46485272.pdf.
121 See generally Patrick Delaney, Transitional Corruption: Regulation Across
Borders, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (2007) (discussing several of the approaches summarized
in Fig. I1); Baer, supra note 39 (discussing elements of these approaches).
379
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Figure 11: The Pros and Cons for Hong Kong's Companies of
Each of the Four Approaches to Encouraging
Corporations to Adopt Anti-Corruption Measures
Approach Pros Cons
No-
regulation
approach
Low cost and preserves
the status quo.
Give up gains from
industry-wide co-operation,
needs to rely on case law to
develop UKBA- and
FCPA-like "adequate
procedures" doctrines.
Methods- Provides a consistent Expensive and
based approach used by all inappropriate for many
approach companies. Hong kinds of companies.
Kong would be the
first to try this
approach in its pure
form.
Results- Approach generally Provides little guidance to
based adopted by most upper- companies and exposes
approach income OECD. United them to risks.
Kingdom-United States
uses a "results plus"
system (results with a
bit guidance on
means).
Self- Companies know what Self-regulation tends to
regulating measures should work work for members' own
approach best for them. self-interest rather than
social benefit. Less harsh
than legislators might be.
The methods-based approach to regulating business measures
represents the least likely option for POBO reform. Any specific
requirements that companies engage in certain kinds of activities
would represent too large a financial burden for small, low-risk
companies.12 The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has tended
to encourage particular companies to engage in specific business
122 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, An Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Programme for Business: A Practical
Guide, at 93 (2013) (noting the financial burden for small and medium-sized companies in complying with anti-corruption
requirements).
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measures as part of settlement agreements. 12 3 The U.K. Ministry
of Justice provides representative lists of the kinds of activities
companies could undertake.' 24 Given the diversity of the Hong
Kong economy, such a methods-based approach appears highly
unworkable.125
A good case can be made for a self-regulating approach to
business anti-corruption measures. Namely, the POBO does not
need to provide incentives by allowing corporate compliance
programs to serve as a defense from corporate prosecution for
corruption. Instead, business associations, industry groups and
other organizations in Hong Kong can impose rules on members
(on either a voluntary or mandatory basis). Such self-regulation
seems to fit with Hong Kong's established business practices.126
Hong Kong's businesses are also very well organized into
associations and other groupings.127 As we describe below and in
the Appendix, we predict the LegCo will choose this (sub-optimal)
approach instead of the more optimal results-based approach.
Our brief discussion above points to three approaches to law
making aimed at encouraging Hong Kong's companies to
introduce corporate measures against corruption. The first
approach basically embodies the status quo, encouraging the ICAC
to chase individuals and to rely on foreign law enforcement to deal
with the difficult corporate corruption cases. The second approach
123 See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11-17, United States v. ABB, 10-CR-644 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2010) (laying out criteria for new internal controls and policies), available
athttp://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-29-10abbinc-plea.pdf;
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7-8, United States v. AGA Med. 08-CR-172-JMR
(D. Minn. June 3, 2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-agree.pdf.
124 See Bribery Act, supra note 49, at § 9.
125 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Economic and Trade Information
on Hong Kong (Aug. 26, 2014), http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business
-news/article/Market-Environment/Economic-and-Trade-Information-on-Hong-
Kongletihk/en/1/1XOOOOOO/1XO9OVUL.htm (estimating the difficult-to-monitor service
sector at more than 90% of the territory's GDP, including a combined 40% share for
finance, trade, and logistics).
126 See BOB BEATTY, DEMOCRACY, ASIAN VALUES, AND HONG KONG: EVALUATING POLITICAL ELITE BELIEFS 186
(2003).
127 See HKSARG Departments, Trade Associations & Consulates, HKTDC
RESEARCH, http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/subindex/en/
HKSARG-Departments-Trade-Associations-Consulates/1X473TC9/1/0.htm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2014).
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focuses on industry-based self-regulation (already in use to a
limited extent). The third approach argues that if the POBO will
include corruption-related offences for corporate criminality, then
the POBO should also offer counter-balancing defenses.
A. Allow the United States and the United Kingdom to police
corporations while ICAC focuses mostly on individuals
Such an option represents the status quo (or no regulation
approach). Advocates of the "corporate criminalization plus
compliance program defense" approach would need to prove that
corporate criminalization addresses some harm that prosecution
focused on natural persons does not address. In other words, why
prosecute companies when the Independent Commission Against
Corruption ("ICAC") and Department of Justice can actually
investigate and prosecute the persons committing the corruption
directly? The FCPA was Congress's response to public demands
for action in the face of recent corruption scandals and seeming
inaction by government.128 The UKBA had a similar genesis fresh
from a recent corruption scandal and widespread dissatisfaction
with the United Kingdom's anti-corruption measures, which were
laxer than those of other OECD members.'2 ' The public in both
cases considered foreign bribery a problem.'" Hong Kong suffers
from none of this "mischief' which led to the passage of the FCPA
and UKBA.
The other reason why Hong Kong could take a lax position of
corporate criminalization is that Hong Kong authorities know that
U.K. and U.S. prosecutors will do this work for them. Both the
128 See WALTER LEFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 207-08 (2d ed. 1993) (describing "Bananagate," in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission discovered that the United Brands Company paid
Honduran President, Oswaldo Lopez Arellano and other officials, S 1.25 million in bribes
to trigger the collapse of a Latin American banana cartel); see generally BEN R. RICH &
LEO JANOS, SKUNK WORKS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR OF MY YEARS AT LOCKHEED (1st ed.
1994) (recounting the story behind America's high-stakes quest to dominate the skies
Skunk Works - America's most secret and successful aerospace operation);see also John
Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution ofan Expanding FCPA,
26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 25, 25-26 (2012) (contrasting popular support
for the Act's passage with its initially rare use).
129 See Jacqueline Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative Reform in the
United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 365, 372-74 (2011).
130 See id.
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FCPA and UKBA have extra-territorial application and allow for
corporate prosecution.'3 1 The FCPA does not even face a double
jeopardy limitation. 132 After China, the United Kingdom and
United States represent two of Hong Kong's largest trading
partners. 33  The LegCo could comfortably wait while U.S. and
U.K. prosecutors impose criminal sanctions on Hong Kong's most
egregious corporate bribers abroad. The alternative would
represent rethinking Hong Kong's approach to criminal liability
(or at least part of it). Indeed, we predict the LegCo will follow
exactly this strategy in the short-term.
B. Introduce a system of industry self-regulation, combined
with scorecards and sanctions.
Many upper-income countries, particularly those with a strong
corporatist approach to industrial relations, have opted for
industry-based self-regulation rather than Anglo-American-style
corporate criminality.' 3 4 France, Norway, Germany and several
other countries have encouraged labor unions and management
unions to work together on lists of business measures their
national companies should take to reduce corruption."' Nothing
suggests that Hong Kong must slavishly follow the United States
131 Steve Giles, Managing Fraud Risk: A Practical Guide for Directors and
Managers 147 (2012).
132 Sally Ramage, Fraud and the Serious Fraud Office: Fraud Law: Book Two 51
(2005).
133 Hong Kong's Principal Trading Partners in 2013, Trade and Industry
Department, http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/mainland/trade.htmi.
134 See Sigurt Vitols, The Origins of Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial
Systems: Germany, Japan, and the United States, 20 (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fir
Sozialforschung [Berlin Soc. Sci. Ctr.], Discussion Paper, 2001) (discussing Germany's
development of corporatism, a system in which labor unions and management group
organizations work together in consultative bodies to resolve industry-wide issues, in the
years before World War II), available at http://www.wzb.eu/sites/
default/files/ul3/vitols_dpi01-302.pdf; Vitols, supra note 134, at 11-12 (discussing
Germany's corporatist approach to banking regulation); see also Scott Fritzen, Beyond
"Political Will": How Institutional Context Shapes the Implementation of Anti-
Corruption Policies, 24 POL. & Soc., No. 3 79, 88-89 (2005) (discussing Vietnam's
state-centric version of corporatism).
135 See generally Roland Czada, From Muddling Through to Struggling Through, in
GERMANY AND JAPAN AFTER 1989: REFORM PRESSURES AND POLITICAL SYSTEM
DYNAMICS 75 (Roland Czada & Kenji Hirashima eds., 2009) (describing how West
Germany's corporatist regulatory systems retrenched and adapted after reunification with
East Germany).
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and the United Kingdom because of their shared common-law
heritage. Indeed, as Hong Kong policymakers design an approach
to discourage their companies from paying bribes, they will need
to think about the applicability of that system in the mainland.1 6
Hong Kong's industry groups could devise business measures
appropriate for their members. Such measures would benefit from
consultation by these groups' members, and benefit from a
specificity that national-level programs cannot achieve. Industry
associations and groups could also engage in limited policing (at
least as to the extent to which different members have complied
with business association requirements to adopt codes of conduct
and other business measures).
We argue against the industry-based regulation in Hong Kong
for three reasons. First, government-led cheerleading of industry-
based regulations runs against accepted practice. Hong Kong
regularly ranks among the least regulated, most free economies in
the world.'" Attempts to coerce business associations to engage in
industry-wide anti-corruption measures would probably fail.
Second, the fragmentation of Hong Kong's industry would make
an industry-by-industry approach impossible.' Hong Kong has
over 450 industries, representing literally hundreds of thousands of
companies. 139 Asking each of these industry groups to consult
with their members would impose a large regulatory-based cost on
business. Third, making trade associations vicariously liable for
the lack of anti-corruption business measures of their membership
would break the classical agency chain relationship the UKBA and
136 We have reviewed the arguments for making "Chinese-compatible" law in
another paper. With closer political and legal integration between Hong Kong and the
mainland, Hong Kong's policymakers will want to look at models that have worked in
both common-law as well as civil-law systems. Having laws that provide appropriate
incentives in a civil-law system will help ensure that companies do not attempt to engage
in "regulatory arbitrage"-seeking defenses in Hong Kong unavailable in China (and
visa versa).
137 See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2014 INDEX OF EcONOMIC FREEDOM (2013),
available at http://www.heritage.org/index (ranking Hong Kong No. 1); see also
Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.
org/rankings (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (putting Hong Kong second behind Singapore).
138 Brian C. Fong, Hong Kong's Governance Under Chinese Sovereignty: The
Failure of the State-Business Alliance After 1997 133 (2014) (suggesting that Hong
Kong's industries are fragmented).
139 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2012), http://service-
providers.hktdc.com/.
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FCPA try to create.14 0 Legal persons "socialize" their agents and
members into conducts they might not otherwise commit.14' These
principals should have measures aimed at preventing such
socialization, though the efficacy of such measures has not been
empirically proven.1
42
C. Introduce a "results-plus" system modeled roughly on
U.K and U.S. systems into the POBO, thus mixing
corporate liability with corporate defenses
Both the United States and United Kingdom have a "results-
plus" legislative structure, which provides incentives to firms to
adopt anti-corruption business measures. 143 The results-based
approach comes from the fact that legislation in both the United
States and the United Kingdom outlines the results that corporate
anti-corruption compliance programs must achieve: namely a
business culture free of bribes and corruption. 4 4 The legislation in
force leaves the decision about the means of achieving those
results to companies.' 4 5 In fact, the system differs from others
such as those in France, Germany or other upper-income
jurisdictions, in that both the U.S. and the U.K. justice
administrations have provided specific guidance to companies
about the types of programs that may bring partial relief from
prosecution. 146 The compliance programs outlined in the U.S.
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines and UKBA Guidance do not
represent mandatory requirements.147 However, companies would
140 See Crim. Div., U.S. DOJ & Enforcement Div., U.S. SEC, A Resource Guide to
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 27 (Nov. 14, 2012) (indicating that traditional
agency principles apply to liability under FCPA).
141 See generally Saviour Nwachukwu & Scott Vitell, The Influence of Corporate
Culture on Managerial Ethical Judgments, 16 J. Bus. ETHICs 757 (1997) (discussing
empirical studies).
142 See Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of
Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17 J. Bus. ETHICs 619 (1998) (presenting empirical study's
findings that codes of conduct do not modify employee behavior).
143 See generally Baer, supra note 39 (describing these systems' basic features).
144 See BRIAN P. LOUGHMAN & RICHARD A. SIBERY, BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION:
NAVIGATING THE GLOBAL RISKS ("The goals of [anti-corruption compliance] programs
are ... to deter, detect, and prevent bribery and corrupt payments.").
145 See id.
146 See Bribery Act, supra note 49.
147 See infra note 159, 320.
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be remiss to ignore the specific programs outlined in these
documents.148 In this way, the UKBA and FCPA provide a results-
based approach to corporate measures, plus guidance about
specific measures companies (in general) can take.149
The LegCo should adopt changes to the POBO that encourage
companies to adopt anti-corruption compliance programs. As
shown above, Hong Kong companies fall far behind companies
from other countries in the quality of their corporate compliance
and anti-corruption reporting. "so We argue for a legislative
approach (providing incentives for companies to engage in anti-
corruption compliance programs directly in legislation) for three
reasons. First, legislative provisions remove the discretion
currently exercised by U.S. prosecutors. Second, legislative
provisions would be easier to put into practice. Given Hong
Kong's current legal system, the only way to introduce all the
needed provisions at the regulatory level would be to have various
government departments create new regulations on the companies
they regulate. 's' Third, a legislative provision in the POBO
provides a credible signal to companies that the Hong Kong DOJ
will apply corporate criminality analysis and consider anti-
corruption business measures as a legitimate defense to such
charges. The U.S. experience shows that uncertainty and
prosecutorial caprice result from the U.S. Department of Justice's
wide latitude to decide how thoroughly a company's business
measures indemnify it from criminal liability.15 2
We cannot predict what those business measures will look like,
or the extent to which they should shield the legal person from
liability. The variance of business measures adopted by
companies, and even proposed measures by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the U.K. Ministry of Justice, suggests that one size
I48 See id.
149 See id.
150 See supra Section IV.
15 Because of the fragmentation of Hong Kong's executive structure, describing
such an approach would take too long. Because we dismiss this approach, we do not
spend much time describing this approach.
152 See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1450-52 (2007) (describing the
shifting set of factors the Justice Department has asked prosecutors to consider when
deciding whether to prosecute a company).
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does not fit all. ' The POBO should offer an "adequate
procedures" defense similar to those offered by U.S. and U.K.
legislation. However, we cannot predict what those defenses may
look like. We therefore recommend that the public be consulted
before the POBO is amended in any way, so that appropriate
affirmative defenses can be included.
We recommend Option 3, introducing an "adequate
procedures" provision into the POBO, after consultation with the
public. This option would provide companies with a defense from
prosecution for having strong anti-corruption compliance
programs. In practice, though, we predict that Hong Kong's
legislators will choose Option 1, "no regulation," for next year (as
the result of natural inertia). Without the tactics we recommend in
the Appendix, Hong Kong's legislators will choose Option 2 as
their final option (leaving the POBO intact). We provide the
political-economy analysis in the Appendix showing that only
Option 2 would manage to win a majority of votes in the LegCo.
We also show in the Appendix the steps promoters of our
recommendation would need to take in order to make voting for
our recommendation "politically incentive compatible." If the
ICAC or another agency engages in this adoption strategy, we
predict the LegCo will adopt the recommendation by a narrow
majority.
What elements of a compliance program should provide relief
from prosecution? We suggest a public debate should define these
elements. But what shapes the public debate? The International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") suggests various corporate
policies to reduce corruption. 15 By and large, these policies
follow similar guidance in the OECD Guidelines. ' The rules
focus on bribery, extortion/solicitation, trading in influence, and
laundering the proceeds of the corrupt practices. Figure 12
shows the ICC Anti-Corruption Rules in summary form.' The
153 See Bryane Michael, Making Hong Kong Companies Liable for Foreign
Corruption, J. FINANCIAL CRIME (forthcoming).
154 See INTER'L CHAM. COM., ICC RULES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION (2011),
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/201 I1/ICC-Rules-on-Combating-
Corruption-201 1.
is5 See id; OECD Guidelines, supra note 26.
156 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 26.
157 See INTER'L CHAM. COM., supra note 154.
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list proves most enlightening, as many of its recommendations
lack the severity of Anglo-American law. Rules related to third
parties provide a useful example. In the UKBA and FCPA, as we
have mentioned, companies may hold vicarious liability for the
bribery of their business partners.' As such, business measures
recommended by the U.K. Ministry of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Justice focus on conducting due diligence and
auditing business partners.' The ICC anti-corruption rules, in
contrast, merely ask companies to keep lists of their business
partners (in case prosecutors come asking) and to inform them of
the company's anti-corruption policies.'6 0
Figure 12: The ICC's Anti-Corruption Rules
ICC Anti- Elements of the Rule / Summary Provisions
Corruption Rule
Prohibited
Practices
Third Parties
Corporate Policies
on Business
Partners
Corporate Policies
Bribery, extortion/solicitation, trading in
influence, and laundering the proceeds of the
corrupt practices.
Provides a list of third-parties. Admonishes to
inform third-parties not to engage in corruption
and to not hire these parties for matters unrelated
to the comp bu
Encourages companies to sign agreements with
partners that they will uphold the company's anti-
corruption policies, permit an audit of its practices,
and not make payments in cash. The company
should keep a record of all transactions with
public bodies (and allow auditors to inspect that
list). Should also ensure that partners adopt
similar measures. Avoid dealing with companies
suspected of paying bribes. Ability to
contractually suspend relationship if concerned
partner is paying bribes, conduct due diligence on
partners, and transparent procurement.
Political contributions should be made according
158 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988) (explaining that both pieces of
legislation allow vicarious liability).
159 See U.K. Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance 27-28 (2010)
(providing due diligence procedures).
160 See INTER'L CHAM. COM., supra note 154, at art. 3.
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on Political and
Charitable
Contributions and
Sponsorships
Corporate Policies
on Gifts and
Hospitality
Corporate Policies
on Facilitation
Payments
Corporate Policies
on Conflicts of
Interests
Corporate Policies
on Human
Resources
to the law and reviewed (though not specified by
whom). Charitable contributions should not be a
subterfuge for corruption (though these are not
necessarily reviewed). "Special care" for
contributions to organizations having politically
exposed persons.
Sets out a five conditions for giving gifts and
hospitality (namely they comply with local laws
and the procedures of the giver and receiver).
Facilitation payments should not be made. If
made under duress, they should be accurately and
properly accounted as such.
Conflicts of interest should be disclosed and/or
avoided. Companies should observe any "cooling
off' periods if hiring former regulators.
Staff should be hired based on competence (rather
than other factors), they should not be punished
for whistleblowing and persons in high-risk
positions should be trained in anti-corruption.
Corporate Policies All transactions appear in the books and no "off-
on Financial and books" transactions may be made. No non-
Accounting existent expenditures are recorded, and cash
payments are carefully recorded. No accounting
records should be destroyed. Independent auditing
should bring improper activities to light.
Elements of a Statements of commitment to the company's anti-
Corporate corruption program at various levels of the
Compliance organization and most of the measures in the
Program OECD Guidelines.
Which parts of the ICC Anti-Corruption Rules might best
serve the DOJ as concrete and objective tests of a company's
commitment to preventing corruption? We argue that Hong
Kong's prosecutors could potentially use six measures to test the
extent of "adequate procedures" in a company (assuming that the
POBO eventually allows these procedures to serve as a defense
against corporate bribery). First, prosecutors could assess the
extent to which a company hired third parties for matters unrelated
to the company's business.16' Widespread contracts of this nature
161 See INTER'L CHAM. COM., supra note 154, at art. 2 (laying out specific policies
that a company could enact to deter suppliers and other partner companies from fraud
and other corruption).
,
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may provide tangible proof that company managers had not
exercised adequate care to control risks related to giving
intermediaries bogus payments under the guise of employment
contracts. Second, investigators could assess the extent to which
the company insisted on auditing its partner companies'
accounting records and business practices.'62 Openness to third-
party audits signals that the company has nothing to hide. 6 3 Third,
investigators could assess the extent to which the company
reviews political contributions for potential self-serving. '" By
closely controlling political contributions itself, the company could
forestall potential ICAC investigation for inappropriate, and
potentially corrupt, campaign contributions.165 Each of these three
provisions might serve as a tangible list for further public
consultation.
Public consultations about defenses available in the POBO
may focus on three other tangible areas of ICAC and DOJ
surveillance. First, facilitation payments: if made under duress,
they should be accurately and properly accounted as such.16 6 The
POBO does not allow for extortion as a defense.66 Nevertheless,
to the extent the company has self-disclosure arrangements in
place and a clear system of accounting for extortion payments,
these systems will probably show the company has nothing to hide
from prosecutors. Second, prosecutors can find comfort that the
company has adequate measures to prevent bribery if its staff, or
preferably its board of directors, conduct periodical risk
assessments and independent reviews of compliance and engage in
corrective measures. 16' These reviews and corrective measures
constitute a stock of papers and evidence showing the company's
169-
active vigilance in preventing corruption. Third, companies can
prove their desire to prevent corruption by appointing one or more
senior officers (full- or part- time) to oversee and coordinate the
corporate compliance program with adequate authority to make
162 See id. at art. 3(A)(b).
163 See id.
164 See id. at art. 4(c).
165 Id.
166 See id. at art. 6
167 See INTER'L CHAM. COM., supra note 154, at art. 6.
168 See id.at art. 10(c).
169 See id.
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decisions and take action. 7 0 Such internal systems demonstrate
that the company at least has tried to prevent, detect, and remedy
corruption.171
Public consultation on appropriate procedures defenses should
use the ICC anti-corruption rules as a framework for organizing
the public consultation. The ICAC has published numerous books
and guides for various industries in Hong Kong, which we discuss
in this article's final section.'7 2 These should serve as a base for
discussion, rather than as a definitive model. The data we have
presented have shown that the majority of Hong Kong companies
have not taken up these materials. ' During the public
consultation, specific business measures can focus on the six items
we have mentioned from the ICC anti-corruption rules.'74 The
ICAC materials and other business measures (such as those listed
in Figure 2) can also serve as a basis for further discussion.
While our analysis indicates that Hong Kong's business
associations should not serve as the primary source of work on
business anti-corruption measures, these business associations
have an important role to play. As we argued above, Hong Kong's
roughly 450 business associations and groupings can provide
guidance. Given the positive experiences in other jurisdictions, we
think Hong Kong's business associations have a role to play in
helping companies adopt anti-corruption measures.
VI. Hong Kong's Business Associations and their Role in
Promoting Business Measures
Business associations play an important role worldwide in
encouraging members and non-members alike to adopt anti-
corruption measures. The OECD Guidelines outline four roles of
business associations in encouraging members and other
businesses to adopt anti-corruption measures. " First, business
associations should "disseminat[e] information on foreign bribery
issues, including regarding relevant developments in international
and regional forums, and [provide] access to relevant
170 See id. at art. 10(e).
171 See id.
172 See infra Section XII.
173 Seeid.
174 See.supra Section V.C.
175 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 26, at B. I -B.4.
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databases . . .""' Second, business associations should "mak[e]
training, prevention, due diligence, and other compliance tools
available . . . .""' Third, they should provide "general advice on
carrying out due diligence .. . . "' Fourth, they should give
"general advice and support on resisting extortion and
solicitation."17 9
Much of the guidance provided by business associations
worldwide looks relatively similar. For example, the Federation of
German Industries has published a series of recommendations in
Preventing Corruption."so These address compliance with the law,
exemplary behavior of corporate management, policies to deal
with suppliers and customers, policies to deal with gifts and other
remunerations, separating business and private expenditures,
managing conflicts of interest arising from outside professional
commitments or capital interests and rules on the engagement of
agents.'"' The Federation recommends to members five blanket
business measures, including training and continuing education,
staff rotation in sensitive areas, internal checks-and-balances,
sourcing from alternative suppliers, and implementing strict
accounting, auditing and reporting requirements.182
Hong Kong's business associations should not take the lead in
promoting business measures through self-regulation. Figure 13
shows the number of business associations in various industries
operating in Hong Kong (or by Hong Kong companies). Roughly
450 associations exist in Hong Kong, serving literally hundreds of
thousands of companies.'8 3 Creating pan-association rules through
176 Id. at B.I.
177 Id. at B.2.
178 Id. at B.3.
179 Id. at B.4; see also David Hess & Thomas Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A
Principled Approach: The C2 Principles, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 593 (2000) (arguing
that public opinion and large business groups have been successful and pushing
individual companies to adopt anti-corruption measures).
180 See FED'N GERMAN INDUS., PREVENTING CORRUPTION (2007), available at
http://www.bdi.eu/bdi-english/downloadcontent/Marketing/
Flyer PreventingCorruption 3._Auflage_2007.pdf.
181 See id.
182 See id.; see also INTER'L CHAM. COM., supra note 154 (reflecting principles
roughly parallel to those in the German federation's brochure and guidance from similar
industry groups).
183 See infra Figure 13.
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organizations like the Federation of Hong Kong Industries or the
Association of Hong Kong Business Associations Worldwide
would eliminate the gains each association could achieve by
focusing on each industry's corruption risks. However, rules
embodied in legislation or regulation would represent too great a
regulatory burden, for reasons we discussed in the previous
section.
Figure 13: Too Many Associations in Hong Kong for Self-
Regulation
Category No. of Category No. of
assocs. assocs.
Accounting Services
Architecture &
Planning
Baby Products
Books & Printed
Items
Building Materials,
Hardware &
Machinery
Design Services
Electronics &
Electrical Appliances
Environmental
Services
Finance &
Investment
Footwear
Garments, Textiles &
Accessories
Handbags & Travel
Goods
Household Products
Insurance
Jewellery
Logistics & Transport
Services
Medical Supplies &
Medicine
Photographic
14
2
1
2
7
4
11
3
14
3
23
1
8
8
12
17
17
Advertising Services
Auto Parts & Accessories
Banking Services
Building & Construction
Services
Business Management &
Consultancy Services
Education & Training
Engineering Services
Film / Audio-Visual
Production
Food & Beverages
Furniture & Furnishings
General / Chambers of
Commerce
Health & Beauty
Information Technology
Services
Interior Design Services
Legal Services
Medical & Healthcare
Services
Packaging Materials
4 Public Relations
2
2
3
20
3
2
7
6
26
4
130
1
20
1
6
2
4
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Equipment
Raw Materials & 20 Real Estate Services 13
Chemicals
Stationery & Office 1 Surveying & Quality 6
Equipment Inspection / Testing
Technology 6 Telecommunications 1
Toys & Games 2 Watches & Clocks 5
Source: See HK Economy, HONG KONG TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-
news/subindex/en/Hong-Kong-Industry-Profiles/iX47J8XF/1/0.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014).
Hong Kong's business associations have a key role to play as
effective conduits for communication from the ICAC and a
reformed Ethics Development Centre (see below). Hong Kong's
business associations at present play little part in promoting the
work of the ICAC or the Ethics Development Centre. 8 4 Figure 14
shows the industries targeted by each of the ICAC's industry-
specific guidance. Eight out of the eleven sectors covered have
guidance produced ostensibly exclusively by the ICAC (without
external partners). Given our review of the materials, the abstract
nature of the material strongly suggests the lack of local partners
in the development of much of this material.
Figure 14: Little Business Involvement in ICAC's Business
Measures Work
Inusr Lite NGovrmn (Sautr geny Patnr
General
Insurance
Sector
None.
The Life Underwriters Association of Hong Kong,
General Agents and Managers Association of Hong Kong,
The Hong Kong Federation of Insurers, The Hong Kong
Confederation of Insurance Brokers, Institute of Financial
Planners of Hong Kong, Professional Insurance Brokers
Association.
Estate Agency None.
Trade
Travel and None (Hong Kong Tourism Board is government-
Tourism subsidized)
Industry
Handling of None.
184 See Figure 14.
I
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Credit Card
Data
Telecommunic None.
ations Industry
SMEs None.
Construction None.
Industry
Professionals Hong Kong Institute of Architects, Hong Kong Institute
of Surveyors, Hong Kong Institute of Engineers.
Financial None.
Services Sector
Ethics International Federation of Accountants, Hong Kong
Promotion Exchange (HKEx), Hong Kong Institute of Directors,
Federation of Hong Kong Industries, American Chamber
of Commerce in Hong Kong, Chinese General Chamber
of Commerce, Chinese Manufacturers' Association of
Hong Kong, Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association,
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.
Source: See HONG KONG ICAC, http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014). Review covers English-language publications only,
based on listed partner organizations with whom the ICAC generated the
publication.
Business associations also have a role to play in providing
direct advice and guidance following the ICC model. In other
countries, business associations and non-profits have provided
more guidance to individual companies than government agencies
have.'s Figure 15 shows several prominent examples of NGOs
that have produced business guidance, often with business
funding. 186 Most Transparency International chapters produce
educational materials with government and/or business-sector
funding.'
Figure 15: Private Sector Prevention Work Internationally
Done by the Private Sector ItselfRather than a Preventive
Anti-Corruption Agency
185 GAN INTEGRITY SOLUTIONs, BUSINEss ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, Guidelines
and Compliance Systems, available at http://www.business-anti-corruption.com
/resources/anti-corruption-tools-inventory/guidelines-and-integrity-systems.aspx (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014).
186 Id.
187 See WHO WI ARE, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, htp://www.transparency.org/
whowcare/accountability/whosupportsus/2/
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NGO Description
Transparency
International
Norway
Published Anti-Corruption Handbook for the
Norwegian Business Sector. Funded by the
Finance Market Fund and oversaw by
representatives from 6 law firms, three
international accounting firms and several local
firms.
Business Unity BUSA Anti-Corruption Guide for South African
South Africa SMEs. Produced on behalf of BUSA by the Ethics
(BUSA) Institute of South Africa
INDEM Business Without Corruption - An Action Guide.
Foundation Produced with the Russian Organization for Small
(Russia) and Medium Enterprise and financed through U.S.
business NGO (CIPE) funding).
Center for Reform Toolkit - Combating Corruption: A
International Private Sector Approach. Financed by the National
Private Enterprise Endowment for Democracy (NED) and a joint
effort with the Colombian Confederation of
Chambers of Commerce, Center for the Study of
Democracy, and the Armenian Association for
Foreign Investment & Cooperation.
The ICAC's monopoly position in leading the private sector on
anti-corruption issues might "crowd out" work that the private
sector and NGOs could do better. Almost all the upper-income
countries have one or more NGOs dealing with anti-corruption
matters.'"' The evidence strongly suggests that independent NGOs
that work on anti-corruption have strong and sustainable effects on
reducing corruption.1' Indeed, recent academic evidence suggests
that the heavy-handed approaches to fighting corruption in Asia
worked despite the lack of anti-corruption efforts from civil
society, not because of any such efforts.' 90 Academic observers
note that the ICAC's manpower and budget eclipse those of
188 Many of these include chapters of the international NGO Transparency
International. See Our Chapters, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/ourchapters (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
189 See generally Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in Combating Corruption: Theory and Practice, 44 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 615 (2011) (presenting statistics on factors that impact laws' efficacy in
promoting business measures against corruption).
190 See GOVERNMENTS, NGOs AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THE NEW INTEGRITY
wARRIORS 45-49 (Luis de Sousa, Barry Hindess & Peter Larnour eds., 2008).
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counterpart agencies in other jurisdictions."' However, the ICAC
has more staff than the total of all fourteen that de Sousa studied,
which includes several in low-corruption European jurisdictions.19 2
Such generous resource utilization suggests that the ICAC could
better "leverage" the private sector.
What does the ICAC's work on preventing corruption have to
do with reforming the POBO and promoting the role of business
associations? Neither the POBO nor the ICAC Ordinance give the
Commission the explicit mandate to engage in prevention work.'93
The ICAC has hitherto not needed preventive authorities explicitly
inserted into the POBO.19 4 However, we think an explicit mandate
to engage in the work the Commission already does would help it
promote effective business anti-corruption measures in three ways.
First, the Commission can specifically delegate, sub-contract and
otherwise allocate its legislatively mandated preventive
authorities. At present, the ICAC might have difficulty delegating
the authority to engage in education and other prevention work -
because the ICAC's competence for such work comes froth
tradition rather than legislative mandate.'9 Second, specifically
defined mandates may help prevent mission creep currently
exhibited by the ICAC's work. As previously discussed, the
ICAC's existing budget and manpower dwarf the budgets and
employment of its peers in other upper-income countries.' 96 in a
situation of budget surpluses, the ICAC may have few resource
constraints. However, with more than 15% of the population
falling below the poverty line, the resources the government
spends on over-mandated corruption prevention necessarily
represent an opportunity cost to fund social and welfare
programs.197 Third, an explicit mandate for prevention will serve
191 See, e.g., Luis de Sousa, Anti-Corruption Agencies as Central Pieces in a
National Integrity System (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript presented at professional
conference), available athttp://tinyurl.com/DeSousaPaperLink.
192 Id. at 9.
193 See MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT
IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG 201-08 (2004) (explaining how the ICAC's
prevention role emerged organically as a set of operational and organizational mandates
by the Commissioners to help the ICAC fulfill its mandate).
194 See id.
19s Id. at 206.
196 Sousa, supra note 191, at 9.
197 Fox Hu and Michelle Yun, Hong Kong Poverty Line Shows Wealth Gap with
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as a model for Chinese provinces looking to set up ICAC-like
organizations. The ICAC exerts an important effect on the larger
People's Republic and its provincial authorities." An explicit
prevention mandate can only encourage "copy cat" Commissions
in China's other regions to follow suit.
With an explicit prevention mandate, the ICAC can work more
effectively with business associations on business measures. The
ICAC can spend time and resources to "crowd in" advice from
business associations and NGOs on ways that businesses and
commercial industries can reduce corruption risks among their
members. We describe the specific mechanisms the ICAC can use
in the last section of this paper.'"
VII. Measures Related to Accounting and Financial Audit
Accounting and audits can be seen as a central business
measure aimed at preventing, detecting and investigating
corruption. However, given the highly creative and task-specific
nature of accounting and auditing, international law and specific
countries' domestic legislation cannot give specific guidance for
companies. The United Nations Convention encourages
signatories to outlaw the following six practices: (1) the
establishment of off-the-books accounts; (2) the making of off-the-
books or inadequately identified transactions; (3) the recording of
non-existent expenditure; (4) the entry of liabilities with incorrect
identification of their objects; (5) the use of false documents; and
(6) the intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier
than foreseen by the law.2 " In other words, the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption ("UNCAC") seeks to outlaw
practices already condemned by Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") and other accounting/audit self-regulation.2 0'
The American strategy has revolved around criminalizing
One in Five Poor, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 2013, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-29/hong-kong-poverty-line-shows-wealth-
gap-with-one-in-five-poor.html.
198 See Martin Yip. Can Hong Kong Stay Corruption-Free Under China?. BBC NiWS CHINA, July 10,2013.
http://www.bbc.cominews/world-asia-china-23223457.
199 See infra Section XIll.
200 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 17, at 15.
201 Id.
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inadequate accounting procedures and practices.202 Professors
Kathleen A. Lacey and Barbara C. George see two accounting
provisions from the FCPA as providing the basis for prosecutions
for lax accounting standards.20 3 Section 13(b)(2)(A) establishes
recordkeeping requirements by "mandating that all corporations
'make and keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer."' 20 4 Section 13(b)(2)(B)
requires corporations to "devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that transactions and assets are properly maintained." 20 5 In theory,
the SEC could apply sanctions to companies who do not possess
sufficiently adequate accounting standards. In practice, though,
the SEC applies these provisions only once a bribery-related
impropriety occurs. 20 6 For corruption they cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, U.S. prosecutors may obtain a conviction for
inadequate accounting.207
Yet, the FCPA's provisions extend beyond issuers of listed
securities. 208 Provisions in the Act also strongly encourage
partners of U.S. listed firms to implement accounting and auditing
controls. 209 Stuart Deming highlights a number of other partners
who need to take appropriate accounting and audit measures to
provide reasonable assurance that bribery and corruption do not
occur in their commercial transactions. 210 Specifically, U.S.
202 Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara C. George, Expansion of SEC Authority into
Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 121 (1998).
203 Id. (citing 15 USCS § 78m (b)(2)(A)).
204 Id. (citing 15 USCS § 78m (b)(2)(B)).
205 Id.
206 Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Inplications of the
Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 500 (2006).
207 Id. at 497.
208 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA); 15 U.S.C § 78dd-.
209 Deming, supra note 206, at 472-74 ("The accounting and record-keeping
provisions . . . to issuers of securities, as defined by § 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"), which are required by the Exchange Act to register under § 12
or file reports under § 15(d) or which have filed a registration statement that has not yet
become effective under the Securities Act of 1933.").
210 Id.
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corporations may be held liable under the accounting provisions of
the FCPA if they know of inadequate accounting and auditing
standards of related third parties and agents.2 As we have alluded
to previously, Deming explicitly notes that, "proving a violation of
the record-keeping provisions is more straightforward and more
likely to succeed than proving a violation under the anti-bribery
provisions." 2 1 2 He argues that "[t]he evidence necessary to
establish a violation is much simpler and less likely to confuse a
jury."2 13 Different from the anti-bribery provisions, "there is no
need to prove 'corrupt intent,' to.prove whether a 'foreign official'
was involved, or to prove whether a promise, offer, or payment
was made to 'obtain or retain business."'
2 14
The recent trend in U.S. law has shifted toward increased
legislation on accounting and accounting provisions aimed at
detecting - and preventing - corruption. Laura Kress argues that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") has led to the revitalization of
the FCPA. 215 Figure 16 shows several of the provisions, which she
argues, have led to greater self-policing by companies.2 16 As Kress
notes, "Sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding the
maintenance of proper books and records mirror the provisions of
the FCPA, which had already existed for twenty-five years before
the SOX was enacted." 217 Furthermore, "[i]t is almost as if the
SOX reminded the DOJ and SEC to 'rev up' the enforcement of
the FCPA." 218 Other provisions criminalize making false
statements to auditors. 219 Specifically, the SEC Rule on the
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits and the subsequent
decision in SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., provide the
211 Id. at 476 ("An individual or entity can be held vicariously liable for the conduct
of a third party when the third party is acting for or on behalf of the individual or
entity.").
212 Id. at 492.
213 Deming, supra note 206, at 492.
214 Id.
215 See generally Laura E. Kress, How the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Has Knocked the
"SOX" off the DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U. PITr. J. TECH. L. &
PoL'Y 2 (2009) (arguing that the SOX has allowed the FCPA to get back on its feet and
finally take a step in the right direction toward combating bribery and fraud).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 16.
218 Id.
219 See Kress, supra note 215, at 17-18.
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legal basis for providing complete, true and fair disclosure of
financial information.22 0
Figure 16: Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Related to
Fighting Corruption
Piso Descr*iio
Section 404 of
the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act
Compels both management and external auditors to
report on the adequacy of a company's internal
control over financial reporting.
15 U.S.C. § Requires companies to implement a system that
7262(a) (2006) documents and tests its financial controls. Under this
system, a company's management must annually
create an internal control report, which affirms
management's personal responsibility in establishing
and maintaining the accuracy of internal controls.
Section 302 of Requires a company's principal executive officer and
the SOX 15 principal financial officer to verify the accuracy and
U.S.C. § 7241 fairness of the company's financial reports.
15 U.S.C. § 7241 These officers must verify that they are responsible
(2006) for the establishment and maintenance of "internal
controls," and that they have disclosed to their
auditors and audit committees any significant
problems in the design and operation of such
controls.
15 U.S.C. Company officers must certify that they have
§§7241a(4-6) disclosed in the reports any significant changes in
their internal control system that might affect these
controls after their evaluations.
Source: Kress, supra note 215.
No other jurisdiction comes close to imposing the kinds of
requirements faced by companies under U.S. law. 22 ' The U.K.
220 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2014) (showing that SEC rulemaking in this area
stems from Section 303 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); see also SEC v. World-
Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F.Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (ordering for a full accounting
and disclosure of wrongfully received benefits).
221 See generally Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act,
2004, c. I § 27 (U.K.) (enacted to amend the law relating to company auditors and
accounts, to the provision that may be made in respect of certain liabilities incurred by a
company's officers, and to company investigations); see also Bribery Act, supra note 49,
at § 7.
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adopted provisions similar to SOX in the Companies (Audit,
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004 and a weak
requirement to maintain adequate accounting records in the
UKBA. 222 Hong Kong - for its part - has adopted several
provisions making financial dissimulation a criminal offense. 23
For example, Chapter 32, Section 274 of The New Companies Act
provides sanctions for failing to keep proper accounts.2 24 Auditors
may also face liability for reporting false information.225 Yet,
Hong Kong's directors and bookkeepers face nowhere near the
same level of liability as their American peers.226
We think that U.S. law goes too far to serve as a model for
Hong Kong. First, we agree with Black, that the FCPA has given
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) powers it
does not want, nor should have.2 27 The SEC serves as a watchdog
for investors' rights - and does not serve as an anti-corruption
agency. 228 Second, the UKBA has not adopted the extensive
accounting provisions contained in U.S. law. 22 9 The UKBA has
only a brief section, noting that companies should have "adequate
procedures" - including accounting procedures.2 30 Third, Hong
Kong's accounting profession - and its professional organizations
- can regulate over the tiny area of Hong Kong. Governments
worldwide have traditionally left accounting and auditing as a self-
222 See generally Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act,
supra note 221.
223 H. K. Companies Ordinance (2012) Cap. 32, 96, § 274 (ordering liability where
proper accounts not kept).
224 Id.
225 Id. at § 408 (discussing offences relating to the contents of auditor's report).
226 Where he discusses the FCPA as being capricious - Cheryl Evans, The Case for
More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability: Where Do We Go From Here, 41 STETSON
L. REv.21, 35(2011).
227 Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global
Corruption is Not Part of the SEC's Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1093, 1119-20 (2012)
("The history of the FCPA, however, is an example of another problem. Congress gave
the SEC power that it did not want, that is not part of its central mission, and that puts a
strain on its resources.").
228 Id. at 2.
229 See F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British are
Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight
against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 8 (2010) (providing a useful review of the
UKBA and its provisions relative to those contained in the FCPA).
23o Id.
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regulating profession given its complex and principles-guided
nature.23 Hong Kong's accounting and audit professionals know
the weaknesses of the current system better than government
regulators.232
The Hong Kong accounting profession as a self-regulating
body should develop a set of standards - with the U.S. experience
in mind. The Hong Kong Society of Accountants knows best the
weaknesses of the current accountant standards in terms of
allowing for fraudulent accounting of corruption-related
transactions. 2 33 The ICAC - for its part - has an important role to
play as facilitator and government agent. The ICAC should host
meetings of the Society and encourage them to consider changes,
which may harm individual interests in the short-run, but improve
the profession and business climate in the long run.
The ICAC also has a role to play as an honest broker for
auditors, as well as accountants. In the last ten years, auditors -
both internal and external - have learned a great deal about
conducting corruption-focused audits.234 Internal audits can assess
the control environment, the performance of a company's anti-
corruption policies, and compliance by staff with those policies.235
Internal auditors can also assess systems, risks and the extent to
which information technology (IT) systems allow for corruption.2 36
The assurance audit, which provides "reasonable assurance" that
the annual accounts provide an accurate view of the company's
finances, represents a key anti-corruption business measure.237
Yet, the annual assurance audit will not look specifically for
corruption unless corruption enters into the audit plan. 23 The
231 Gary M. Cunningham & Jean E. Harris. Enron and Arthur Andersen: The Case of the Crooked E and the Fallen A. 3
GLOBAL PERSPECT IVES ON ACCOUN [ING EDUC. 27, 46 (2006)
232 See Organization, HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
http://www.hkicpa.org.hk/en/about-us/organization/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
233 Id.
234 See generally MUHAMMAD A. KHAN, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO CORRUPTION
AUDITING (Pleier, Jan. 2006) (providing a framework for internal auditors and
government auditors that is effective in the audit of corruption).
235 Id.
236 Inter'I Chain. Com., Corporate Responsibility and Anti-corruption: ICC Rules
on Combating Corruption § 2-9 (2011) (covering the role of these audits).
237 Id.
238 We do not have space to describe the audit methodology or describe the role that
auditing for corruption plays in the annual financial statements assurance audit. We can
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ICAC can lead a discussion about whether the audit profession
wants to insist on a basic corruption-related focus during the
annual assurance audit exercise. We do not list the pros and cons
of this recommendation because Hong Kong's audit profession can
outline these pros and cons for the ICAC.
VIII. Corporate Whistleblower Protection Programs
Corporate whistleblowing policies have become an important
business measure in detecting and remedying the harms from
corruption. As with other business measures, legislation has
provided companies with strong incentives to set-up these internal
whistleblowing procedures. In the jurisdictions most relevant to
Hong Kong - namely the United Kingdom and United States -
both have had legislation in place, which has encouraged
companies to implement whistleblowing programs.239 In the U.S.,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") provides whistleblower
protection for employees of publicly traded companies against
retaliation in fraud cases.2 40 In the United Kingdom, the Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 ("PIDA") has provided strong
incentives to U.K. companies seeking relief from more serious
disclosures made to law enforcement agencies.24 1 In both cases,
companies have sought to provide employees with an avenue to
denounce corruption and other forms of malfeasance before they
turn to law enforcement agencies.24 2
The U.S. legal framework protecting private sector
whistleblowers has gradually strengthened over the years - for
better or for worse. As mentioned above, the whistleblower
only flag here that auditors will not look specifically for evidence of corruption unless
they have a strong reason to look.
239 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 49; Bribery Act, supra note
49.
240 18 U.S.C. § 73-1513(e) (making retaliation against employees for
whistleblowing a criminal offense); cf New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], Listed
Company Manual § 303A. 10 (2009) (requiring listed companies to adopt a code of ethics
for directors, officers, and employees, and that this code must contain compliance
standards and procedures that will facilitate - among other things - whistleblower
protection).
241 See generally Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) (enacted to protect
individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest and to
allow such individuals to bring action in respect of victimization).
242 See id.
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protection afforded by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 represents
the most important measure, even more than the FCPA, which has
encouraged companies to adopt whistleblowing measures. 243
Section 806 of this Act protects whistle-blowers who disclose
FCPA violations by publicly held U.S. companies - at home and
abroad. 2" However, most academics question the efficiency of the
SOX on theoretical grounds. 245 Particularly the Anglo-Saxon
concept of "employment at will," which leads to serious
difficulties in proving that dismissal does not stem from
whistleblowing.24 Other difficulties stem from the fact that most
whistle-blower protection does not cover complaints made to
company officials rather than law enforcement agencies.24 7
At present, U.S. law does not extend whistle-blower protection
for complaints made abroad. In Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corp., Mr. Carnero, an Argentinean citizen residing in Brazil, tried
to sue his employer for retaliation in the form of unfair dismissal
related to his informing company management in the U.S.2 4 8 He
argued that his subsidiary's management had inflated sales figures
243 See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and The Culture of Bribery:
Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 427, 479 (2009) (pointing to several features of these whistleblower protections).
244 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. § 806, 18 U.S.C. §1514A (2002).
245 See generally Meghan E. King, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank
Amendments: The Case Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in
Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1457 (2011) (arguing that
Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provisions do not protect all private-sector employees
and that it has led to difficulties in obtaining protection and relief).
246 Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at- Will
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REv.
543, 603-)5 (2004).
247 See generally David Aron, "Internal" Business Practices?: The Limits of
Whistleblower Protection for Employees Who Oppose or Expose Fraud in the Private
Sector, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 277 (2010) (arguing that federal whistleblower laws
that expressly protect reports of fraud do not apply to employees unless their employer
contracts with the federal government, is a publicly traded company, or has violated a
federal statute); see also Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws:
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REv.
1633, 1634 (2008) (arguing that states should "provide protection to employees who
report either internally or to a supervisor or externally to a government body. .. [s]tate
laws should also extend protection to employees who report to the media or to other third
parties").
248 Carero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2006).
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and created false invoices.2 49 The First Circuit Court ruled that
whistle-blower protections contained in the SOX do not have
extra-territorial effect. 250 While the court's holding seems
relatively secure, for now, academics have suggested a doctrinal
approach toward making whistleblowing extra-territorial.2 5' Vega
specifically argues that the Southern District of New York Court's
recent decision in 0'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd. may provide for the
extra-territorial application of cases like Carnero v. Boston
Scientific Corp. to the extent whistleblowing is conducted or
affects U.S. interests. 252 Such conduct and effects-based tests
could provide future plaintiffs with standing in these kinds of
cases. Indeed, well aware of the weaknesses of the Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblowing measures, several U.S. legislators have led
recent efforts to unify U.S. legislation governing private sector
whistleblowing in the Private Sector Whistle-blower Protection
Streamlining Act of 2012.25 However, most experts would agree
that the Bill has a negligible chance of Congressional adoption.
Private sector observers also question the SOX and the
effectiveness of the FCPA's whistleblowing measures on
empirical grounds. According to recent survey data of U.S.
businesses, "[i]n 2011, 9% of employees observed a potential
FCPA violation compared to 5% in 2009." 254 Only 65% of
employees who observed unethical conduct reported such conduct
in 2011.255 In one recent case, whistle-blowers allegedly brought
their concerns to their company's management several times
before going public. 256 The United States has far more
249 See Brief for Appellant at 1, Camero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d I (I st
Cir. 2006) (Nos. 04-2291 & 04-1801) (Sefior Camero specifically sought relief under 18
U.S.C. § 1514A).
250 Carnero, 433 F.3d at 2-4.
251 See Vega, supra note 243, at 494-98.
252 Id.; see also O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that it would not be unreasonable nor against Congressional policy to extend
jurisdiction because the alleged wrongful conduct and other material acts occurred in the
United States).
253 See generally Private Sector Whistleblower Protection Streamlining Act of 2012,
H.R. 6409, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing to streamline the administration of
whistleblower protections for private sector employees).
254 Ethics Resource Center, 2011 National Business Ethics Survey, at 46 (2012).
255 Id. at 23.
256 See Tides v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2011).
406 Vol. XL
ICAC AND COMPANY ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS
whistleblowing cases than all other countries combined and a
higher proportion of companies with ethics programs than in other
jurisdictions.257 However, data like these, and others that we
provided earlier, suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley inspired model
of whistleblower protection may not be the best for Hong Kong's
companies. Recent innovations introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act
only pull the United States' framework further away from a
workable system for Hong Kong.25 8
Whistleblower laws in the various U.S. states provide no more,
and probably less, guidance for Hong Kong. The states have a
hodgepodge of rules, with many states' legislatures deciding not to
afford whistleblowers any kind of protection.25 9 Indeed, of the
fifty states and the District of Columbia, sixteen out of the fifty-
one states lack any state-level whistleblowing laws.260 Of the rest
with state-level whistleblower protections, seventeen out of the
fifty-one states have laws applicable only for those working in the
public sector. 261 Most states with whistleblower protection
provisions in state legislation allow for a ninety-day limit to bring
civil suits for unfair dismissal and/or retaliation (such as California
and Connecticut).26 2 However, several examples show how these
rules can diverge between states. 2 63  Nebraska-for example-
limits the application of its whistleblower protection provisions to
companies with fifteen employees or more.2 6
The Hawaii Whistle-blowers Protection Act provides one of
the greatest measures of protection to private sector whistle-
257 See Ass'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE (2012), available at https://www.acfe.com/uploaded
Files/ACFEWebsite/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-nations.pdf.
258 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111 th
Cong § 922(21f)(b)(1) (2010) (allowing the SEC to reward employees who denounce
corruption, forbidding employer retaliation against whistleblowers, and providing
whistleblowers with a private cause of action in the case of retaliation).
259 See State Whistleblower Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS
(Nov. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-whistleblower-
laws.aspx.
260 Id.
261 See id.
262 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53297 (West 2014); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m
(2012).
263 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102, 48-1114 (2013).
264 See id.
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blowers. 265 The Act provides the "usual" protections-and allows
greater protections provided for by collective bargaining
agreements to take precedence.2 66 Victims of retribution can bring
a civil suit within two years and courts may order reinstatement,
back-pay, as well as court and legal costs/fees.267 Employer may
be fined up to $5000 for each violation of the Act.268
Yet, outside of the United Kingdom and United States, most
countries have not passed legislation that encourages corporate
whistleblowing programs. Figure 17 provides an assessment for a
range of European countries-and the extent of their legislative
framework which incentivizes whistleblowing programs. 2 69 Most
countries rely on labour law and criminal law to provide their
(inadequate) provisions related to whistleblower protection.
Concomitant with this relatively lacking legal framework, these
countries' companies generally do not tend to denounce
corruption. The figure (by showing that countries without
whistleblower protection tend to have widespread corruption)
provides strong support for the assertion that legislation provides
the incentives for corporate measures against corruption. These
countries' lack of legislation also provides a strong case for pro-
active legislation in Hong Kong aimed at encouraging
whistleblowing.
Figure 17: Private Sector Whistleblowing Provisions in
Selected Civil Law Jurisdictions
Legislative basis
Bulgaria
Legislative basis
Labour Code and Criminal Law provide basic treatment of private
sector whistleblowing.
Practice
Large companies tend to use Western methods of handling
265 HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 378-62--66 (2014).
266 Id.
267 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-63-64 (2014).
268 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-65 (2014).
269 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, ALTERNATIVE TO SILENCE WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION IN 10 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2009), available at http://www.transparency.
org/whatwedo/pub/altemative to silence whistleblower_protectionin_10_curopean-co
untries.
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whistleblowing. SMEs handle through HR departments on ad hoc
basis.
Legislative basis
Labour Code allows employees to take complaints to employers. But
no procedures about handling such complaints. Employers may not
retaliate through dismissal.
Practice
Companies can protect themselves from whistleblowing using
provisions related to slander and false accusation. The TI evaluation
found no internal reporting mechanisms, except anonymous telephone
lines or email addresses. Companies do not react to complaints
effectively.
Legislative basis
Employment Contract Act gives employees right to compensation if
punished for whistleblowing. The Penal Code provides 2 paragraphs
stating that non-disclosure and failure to report first-degree criminal
offences (including some cases of bribery) are punishable.
Practice
No known whistleblowing practice in Estonia.
Legislative basis
Labour Code provides general admonitions about both employer and
employee acting in each others' best interests. A 2009 Bill aimed to
set up new body-the Directorate for the Protection of Public Interest
(DPPI). The DPPI would receive reports of wrongdoing and protect
whistleblowers. Another Bill would cover all kinds of retaliation for
whistleblowing. Under the Bill, the employee would have to prove
that he or she had submitted a whistleblower report. The employer
would have to prove that punitive measures carried out against the
employee were unrelated to that report. The DPPI would provide the
whistleblower with financial assistance for legal representation and
living costs. The whistleblower would also receive ten per cent of the
fine imposed on the wrongdoer by the DPPI.
Practice
Whistleblower reports used as personal retaliation for injustices
committed against staff. Only 17% of economic crimes in 2007 found
through whistleblowing (according to private sector survey). Only
three court cases even remotely related to whistleblowing in the last
10 years.
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Legislative basis
No laws in place, even in labour and criminal code or in sectorial
codes, related to whistleblowing. The 2012 Protected Disclosure in
the Public Interest Bill seeks to remedy this defect.
Practice
Whistleblowers get little relief or protection under Irish law.
Legislative basis
The Labour Law protects workers against dismissal, but not against
other forms of reprisal (physical threat, demotion, transfer, etc.).
Legislative Decree 231/2001 provides an internal reporting procedure
for companies to encourage whistleblowing.
Practice
The TI reports sums up nicely that, "whistleblowing is barely known
in Italy and is often confused with treason." Big companies have
recently established specific whistleblowing procedures, often in order
to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. SMEs usually have no
internal reporting procedures.
Legislative basis
Criminal Law requires employees to disclose information on serious
crimes (like bribery). The Labour Law prohibits the punishment of
employees for whistleblowing and gives the employer primary
responsibility for ensuring compliance.
Practice
No known cases exist where employees relied on Labour Law to
protect themselves from retaliation for whistleblowing. The
Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB), the
Ombudsman and the State Labour Inspectorate receive reports of
wrongdoing in the workplace, including whistleblowing incidents.
Legislative basis
Romania has a Whistleblower Protection Act. However, the Act is
limited to the public sector. The Witness Protection Law contains a
brief reference to whistleblowing and protects people who report
corruption and fraud. The Labour Code contains provisions regarding
abusive dismissal.
Practice
Confidentiality agreements limit possibility of whistleblowing. Few
companies have whistleblower policies or internal regulations
regarding disclosure.
Source: See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 269.
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Unlike in many jurisdictions, Hong Kong still does not have
special legislation in place to encourage companies to protect
whistleblowers. The POBO does not require whistleblowing.2 70
Like the European jurisdictions we have reviewed, Hong Kong's
law does afford some protection to whistleblowers.2 1' Hong Kong
Employment Ordinance and Crimes Ordinance require employees
to denounce corrupt practices.272 However, beyond this minimum,
Hong Kong's policymakers have determined that no further law-
making is needed. The Hong Kong LegCo's Panel on
Administration of Justice and Legal Services has recently observed
that no particular demands exist in society for whistleblower
protection legislation.27 3 In their findings, they note that "the
Administration therefore does not see a practical and justified need
for whistleblower legislation." 27 4 We disagree.
The data suggest that law making would greatly motivate
companies to adopt the measures needed to encourage
whistleblowing. Figure 18 shows data about the whistleblowing
policies and mechanisms available in a sample of Hong Kong
companies. 275 Only 50% of the respondents noted that their
company has a policy for protecting whistleblowers.27 6 Roughly
30% of respondents noted that their companies had whistleblower
protection schemes that protect the anonymity of the person
providing information. 277 Less than 10% of the respondents
worked for companies that penalized retribution for employees
who complained about unethical or illegal behavior in the firm.2 78
Like in other countries, the majority of complaints go to
270 See Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, supra note 40, at § 1-35.
271 See id.
272 Gareth Thomas and Helen Beech, Employment and Employee Benefits in Hong
Kong: Overview, EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE
1, I (2014).
273 LegCo Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services, Review of the
Jurisdiction of the Office of The Ombudsman, LC Paper No. CB (2)1384/08-09(07)
(2009).
274 See id. (referring to protections governing whistleblower protections in the public
sector, despite the fact that most lawmakers and academics have considered public sector
whistleblower protections as a sin qua non for their private sector equivalents).
275 BUSINESS ETHICS: A PATH TO SUCCESS, supra note 93.
276 Id. at 27.
277 Id.
278 Id at 29.
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Figure 18: Mechanisms and Steps to Protect Whistleblowers
in Hong Kong
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whistleblower protection mechanisms for denouncing malfeasance
The figure shows the mechanisms available to protect whistleblowers, including
the ability to remain anonymous, confidentiality of complaints, handling by
independent persons, and penalisation retailiation. The steps employees
can take include contact their supervisor, the HR department, hotlines, internal
auditors, and others. Source: Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries and
Hong Kong Shue Yan University (2007).
Hong Kong should adopt the framework for codes of conduct
and ethics recommended by the Institute of Chartered
Secretaries.2 80 The framework consists of three major points.
First, the Code on Corporate Governance Practices of the Listing
Rules should recommend adopting codes of ethics as a good
practice.28 ' Roughly 90% of the respondents to the Institute of
Chartered Secretaries survey endorsed this action.28 Second, the
Corporate Governance Code for listed companies should include a
provision recommending codes of ethics. Roughly 75% of
respondents agreed with this recommendation. 283 Third,
companies should put whistleblowing policies in place. Roughly
90% of participants endorsed this approach. 284 The ICC
279 Id.
280 Id. at 30.
281 BUSINESS ETHICS: A PATH TO SUCCESS, supra note 93, at 28-35.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 31.
284 Id.
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Guidelines on Whistleblowing provides a useful model. 285
Incentives should seek to make the company's managers the first
stop before reporting potential crime to other authorities.28 6
IX. Creating a Market for Anti-Corruption Corporate
Counsel: Internal (Regulatory) Investigations, Disciplinary
Sanctions and Settlements
Hong Kong law does not provide the same incentives for
companies to self-police as in the United Kingdom, United States,
and increasingly throughout the E.U. In these other jurisdictions,
most of the largest law firms now offer compliance-related
services for dealing with government investigators and/or offer
internal investigations services.287 As shown in Figure 19, U.S.
firms clearly dominate their U.K. colleagues in anti-corruption
knowledge and experience.28 8 Such a difference clearly exists due
to their longer history with pro-active anti-corruption legislation
(the FCPA).28 9 Activist regulation in the United States-and laws
which encourage corporate responses to an ever-changing
regulatory landscape-have encouraged the development of legal
counsel (both inside companies and in the large law firms) capable
of helping their clients avoid corruption. 2 90 These firms also help
companies fight anti-corruption charges-and sometimes even
influence at trial the evolution of anti-corruption law.
Figure 19: Why Can't Law Firms Offer the Same Anti-
285 I.C.C. COMMISSION ON ANTI-CORRUPTION, ICC GUIDELINES ON
WHISTLEBLOWING (2008).
286 David Lewis, Whistleblowing at Work: On What Principles Should Legislation
Be Based?, 30 INDUST. L. J. 169, 170 (2001). See also Indira Carr and David Lewis,
Combating Corruption through Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection, 39
INDUST. L. J. 52 (2010).
287 See Figure 19.
288 See id.
289 "The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 (the "Bibery Act"), which received Royal Assent on April 8, 2010, seeks to change that by
overhauling the U.K.'s bribery laws and going beyond the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA") in several respects."
Michelle Duncan, Palmina Fava & Samantha Kakati, A Comparison of the U.S. Foreign Compt Practices Act and the UK. Bribery
Act, PAUL HASTINGS TAY CURRENT 1, 1 (2010).
290 See Timothy O'Toole & Andrew Wise, You Mean You're Really Going to Try an
FCPA Case? A Checklist of Defenses for Practitioners Handling Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Cases, CHAMPION MAGAZINE (2001) (dealing with the turns and twists of
FCPA-related caselaw), available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=2 1931.
291 See id.
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Corruption Advice in Hong Kong as in Other
Jurisdictions?
Firm LE II Brief Description and/or
Emphasis
Baker &
McKenzie 2 92
Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher &
Flom 293
Clifford Chance2 94
LinklaterS295
Latham &
Watkins296
Freshfields
Bruckhaus
Deringer 2 97
Allen & Overy298
Jones Day 299
X Focus on law enforcement-given
their counsel's former government
experience.
X X Focus on individual liability and
particularly internal investigations.
X X Focus on prevention, risk
assessment and learning through
their online COMPLY program.
Relatively under-developed anti-
corruption offering-probably
because of U.K. orientation.
Latham is "best known for its
representation of corporations and
boards in matters [including]
FCPA ... allegations." -
Chambers USA 2012
Very poorly reported services
related to FCPA.
X X Probably the number one firm in
the area.
Relatively under-developed FCPA
and anti-corruption practice. Work
292 See BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2014).
293 See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, http://www.skadden.com/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2014).
294 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, http://www.cliffordchance.com/home.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014).
295 See LINKLATERS, http://www.linklaters.com/pages/index.aspx (last visited Nov.
10, 2014).
296 See LATHAM & WATKINS, http://www.1w.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
297 See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, http://www.freshfields.com/en/
united-states/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014)
298 See ALLEN & OVERY, http://www.allenovery.com/pages/default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014).
299 See JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
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advising Saudi oil company and
other companies on due diligence.
Kirkland & X X Well-covered in the major areas of
Ellis3 00  anti-corruption representation.
Sidley Austin 301 X X Along with Allen & Overy, one of
the best internationally poised
firms for global anti-corruption
work.
LE means the firm has extensive focus and experience in representing clients
during anti-corruption investigations and/or prosecutions. 11 means the law firm
has extensive focus and experience in representing clients during internal
investigations.
Source: The American Lawyer for rankings (ranked by 2010 revenue) and
company websites for other information.
Hong Kong's current legal structure discourages the
development of these kinds of legal markets-particularly those
related to expanding the use of regulatory investigations.
Regulatory investigations still remain under-used in Hong Kong
for three reasons. First, under Hong Kong law, the risk to the
corporation (as a legal person) is much less than other jurisdictions
like the U.S. or U.K. Under U.S. and U.K. law, principals (both
natural and legal persons) may hold vicarious liability for
corruption-related offences of their agents. 302 In Hong Kong,
liability still primarily imputes to the agent.30 3 Second, Hong
Kong law does not recognize criminal investigations conducted
within the corporation by non-law enforcement officers.3 '4 Third,
regulatory investigations strike at the heart of attorney-client
privilege.30 The POBO certainly recognizes this privilege.30
300 See KIRKLAND &ELLIs, http://www.kirkland.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
301 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, http://www.sidley.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
302 Baer, supra note 39; Bribery Act, supra note 49, at § 14.
303 See Bryane Michael, Can the Hong Kong ICAC Help Reduce Corruption on the
Mainland? 52 (2013).
304 See Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, supra note 40.
305 William McLucas, Howard Shapiro & Julie Song, The Decline of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2, 621, 641
(2006); see also Christopher Sherrin, Distinguishing Charter Rights In Criminal And
Regulatory Investigations: What's. The Purpose Of Analyzing Purpose?, 48 ALBERTA L.
REv. 621-42 (2010) (offering a Canadian perspective).
30o Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, supra note 40, at § 15.
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However, as we discussed previously, the POBO offers no positive
incentives for companies to engage in these kinds of "self-
inflicted" investigations. Nevertheless, policy has a role to play in
encouraging broader use of internal measures in companies aimed
at reducing corruption.
Unlike in Hong Kong, U.S. law delegates a relatively
important role to corporate counsel in setting and enforcing anti-
corruption business measures. Under U.S. law, corporate counsel
provides advice to their employers-and can face similar penalties
for complicity and/or negligence (malpractice). 307 Corporate
counsel-unlike in many jurisdictions-may receive certain types
of "undiscoverable" information (information that prosecutors may
not ask for and/or use at trial). 30' However, the current legal
framework has not necessarily yielded strong incentives for
companies to self-investigate and self-report to the Department of
Justice. In a recent empirical analysis of FCPA enforcement
actions, Professors Choi and Davis find that self-reporting has not
resulted in more lenient treatment of corporations. 309  Thus, no
rational corporation should in the future self-report (unless the
Department of Justice reacts to this statistical analysis). Corporate
counsel's role thus increases as companies have the incentives to
fight to the bitter end ... a bad outcome to be sure.
U.K. law-with its emphasis on equity-promises to provide
Hong Kong with a more appropriate legal framework by
encouraging internal investigations conducted by companies
themselves. Already, the United Kingdom's financial firms have
implemented widespread measures aimed at detecting,
investigating, and curing any harms arising from corruption among
corporate members. 310 Unlike in the United States, internal
investigation procedures related to finding corruption constitute a
307 See Matthew Shabat, SEC Regulation of Attorneys under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Decisions on Efficiency and Their Role in International Anti-Bribery
Efforts, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 987, 1005-26 (1999).
308 See Jean Reed, Corporate Self-Investigations under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 803, 817-23 (1998) (offering more on the mechanics of
regulatory investigations and the role of counsel).
309 Stephen Choi and Kevin Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.U. L. & ECON. REs. PAPER No. 12, 13 (2012).
310 See Peter Yeoh, Bribery Act 2010: Implications for Regulated Firms, 20 J. FIN.
REG. & COMPLIANCE 264, 264-77 (2012) (discussing the effect of self-policing in the
financial industry).
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much stronger statutory defense."' In addition, with the United
Kingdom's emphasis on shifting part of the regulatory cost of
conducting such investigations onto the private sector, the U.K.
model promises to be far less heavy-handed than the U.S.
model.312
Whichever model Hong Kong legislators choose, the data
strongly suggests that providing corporations with positive
incentives to conduct internal investigations and other corporate
measures pays off. These incentives can include the use of such
investigations as a defense against corporate prosecution, taxwrite-
offs, and as a type of "insurance" against widespread corruption in
the company."' In a rather dated (though still relevant) study of
U.S. law, Professors Ruhnka and Boerstler find strong
international evidence showing that regulatory investigations
should rely on positive rather than punitive measures.3 14 They
specifically find a dramatic growth in the enactment of voluntary
corporate codes of conduct by the Fortune 1000 companies in the
period 1985-1994 that broadly parallels the growth in positive
governmental incentives for such programs.' 15 In addition, several
dramatic increases in code enactment and revision activity
coincided with specific governmental incentives for private
compliance programs offered during that period. 316 In the
UNODC's review of anti-corruption policies and codes of
conduct, they find a strong correlation between the company's
home country legislation and the.presence of these policies and
codes." We therefore recommend that Hong Kong policymakers
conduct a study to see to what extent they can encourage self-
311 See generally id.
312 See CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, Oxford
U.P. (Paul Lomas & Daniel Kramer eds, 2008) (discussing internal investigations in the
U.K. private sector and the incentives government provides to shift part of the burden for
conducting these investigations onto the private sector).
313 Norton Rose Fullbright, Hong Kong, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUTION
ASIA PACIFIC LAWS 49, 53 (2014), available at http://www.nortonsrosefulbright.com/filcs/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-asia-
pacific-laws-120953.pdf.
314 John Ruhnka & Heidi Boerstler, Governmental Incentives for Corporate Self
Regulation, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 309, 309-26 (1998).
315 Id.
316 Id. at 323.
317 See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 84.
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policing by Hong Kong's companies."'
X. Introducing Contractual Anti-Corruption Obligations for
Business Partners
Changes to domestic legislation worldwide increasingly
impose criminal and de facto administrative sanctions on
companies whose business partners engage in corruption.319 The
FCPA, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, and
Sarbanes-Oxley have increased liability on companies for the
criminal activities of their business partners at home and abroad.320
Three types of liability arise from the legislation in place-direct
liability, indirect liability, and agency liability.32 1 At the risk of
over-simplification, direct liability stems from payments made by
parent corporations to subsidiaries, indirect liability arises from
payments made by business partners, and agency liability comes
from payments made by individuals in the interests of the
enterprise.322 How far down the agency-chain does liability travel?
Wal-Mart provides a simple illustration of the problem in
defining where liability should stop in the agency chain. 323
Around 2004, the company trained almost 8,000 suppliers and
factory managers on Standards for Suppliers (largely in response
to the potential indemnification from corporate liability offered in
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations). 324 The
company has accounting and ethics reporting standards that
comply with the FCPA and §301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as
318 As we have previously mentioned, the ICAC's budget far exceeds all its upper-
income country peers. A smarter legislative design may help the ICAC save money
while more effectively tackling corruption.
319 These defacto administrative sanctions come from non-prosecution agreements
with the U.S. Department of Justice. Companies reach a monetary settlement with the
DOJ -- which in effect, equals a discretionary administrative fine.
320 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(b)(2H7), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff(c) (2005);
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2005).
321 Justin Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating
and Forecasting the Trend ofMore Frequent and Severe Prosecutions under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 296 (2007).
322 We do not include the UKBA in our discussion, as these provisions are new and
untried in U.K. law.
323 See Aaron Grieser, Defining the Outer Limits of Global Compliance Programs:
Emerging Legal and Reputational Liability in Corporate Supply Chains, 10 OR. REV.
INT'L L. 285, 285 (2008).
324 Id. at 304.
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well as a whistleblowing policy for "[t]he receipt, retention and
treatment of complaints regarding accounting matters; and the
confidential, anonymous submission of complaints regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters." 3 25  Yet, Grieser
estimates if Wal-Mart had conducted anti-corruption trainings and
due diligence monitoring for all its suppliers and partners, such
work would have cost the company $125 million in 2005 (or
roughly 1% of net profits for that year).326
Even a worldwide compliance program did not protect Wal-
Mart from investigation (and informal inquiries) in a number of
jurisdictions. 327 Wal-Mart managers in Mexico allegedly paid
Mexican officials $24 million for permissions to open new stores
throughout the 2000s.3 28 Senior U.S. managers further allegedly
knew about these payments and stopped an internal investigation
into the matter.329 Subsequent to public revelations about the
Mexican subsidiary's bribery, local officials in Los Angeles, San
Diego, Boston, and New York sought to look into the company's
business dealings with local officials in those areas. 13 With
almost 9,000 stores world-wide and thousands of suppliers, Wal-
Mart management will naturally wonder to what extent they
should monitor the work of their agents and partners at home and
abroad.'
Just how many agents and business partners does Wal-Mart
need to supervise in order to minimize its FCPA liability? Jane
Doe I, et al. v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc. recently-tested that question.3 32
In that case, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) lodged
complaints-on behalf of Wal-Mart workers-that the company
had violated its Standards for Suppliers agreements and other code
325 Id. at 305.
326 Id. at 312.
327 Se Elizabeth A. Harris, After Bribery Scandal, High-Level Departures at
Walmart, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/business/after-
walmart-bribery-scandals-a-pattem-of-quiet-departures.html?_r-1.
328 David Barstow, Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at Al.
329 Id.
330 Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart 's U.S. Expansion Plans
Complicated by Bribery Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at Bl.
331 See id.
332 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. Cal. 2009).
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of conduct provisions. 33 The case represents one of the first
attempts to sue a company for corporate negligence for failing to
enforce its anti-corruption (and other) codes of conducts.33 4 The
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed
the claims in 2007.' However, the case represents the first of
many likely cases seeking to hold companies liable for their codes
of conduct and compliance programs."' In our opinion, the court
implied that public policy concerns shall determine whether
companies possess the common law duty of care to its
"stakeholders." 1 7  However, the court reiterated the prevailing
risks-based approach to compliance as the balance of probability-
adjusted harms and benefits.33 ' Figure 20 shows the exact test
proposed by the court.
Figure 20: The California Test for Establishing an Anti-
Bribery Duty of Care
A series of recent rulings have helped create common law doctrine
limiting liability for corruption on long or far-linked agency chains.
Under California common law, courts must weigh considerations such as
the likelihood and predictability of harm, probability of injury, the
closeness of the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, and the
public policy implications of enforcing a company's code of conduct
abroad and on third parties. In other words, they must use a Hand
Test-balancing the probabilities and value-at-risk.339
Based on rulings in Jane Doe I, v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG
(MANx), 2007 WL 5975664(C.D. Cal. 2005), drawing on ratio decidendi from
RatcliffArchitects v. Vanie Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 88 Cal. App. 4th 595, 605
(2001).
Despite such a seemingly simple test for establishing potential
333 Id. at 680.
334 See id. at 683.
335 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98102 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).
336 See id. at 680.
337 See id. at 681-85.
338 Id. at 684.
339 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (outlining
the well-known "Hand Rule" on calculus of negligence).
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liability, federal enforcement action shows that no simple test
exists (or will likely exist) to guide corporate compliance officers.
U.S. Department of Justice enforcement of the FCPA has varied
widely between similar cases. 3 40 To cite a few examples, in the
FCPA enforcement action against Schering-Plough (a large
pharmaceutical company), foreign partners made payments to
foreign official "without the knowledge or approval of any
Schering-Plough employee in the United States."34 1 In another
case, the Department of Justice took an FCPA enforcement action
against Dow Chemical for improper payments made by DE-Nocil,
a fifth-tier subsidiary of Dow.3 42 Again, no Dow employee had
knowledge of, or approved, the payment. 343 Similar to the
California ruling (and the underlying Hand Test doctrine), the
FCPA finds a breach "if a person is aware of a high probability of
the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually
believes that such circumstance does not exist."3 4 4
What does the Wal-Mart case suggest to Hong Kong's
policymakers? The FCPA experience suggests that the costs of
trying to establish a "balance of probabilities" standard with regard
to the duty of corporate anti-corruption care exceed any possible
benefits. In other words, U.S. prosecutors cannot reliably tell if a
company assessed the risks of third-party bribery correctly. A
large number of U.S. companies have adopted codes of conduct
and other anti-corruption business measures-in fear of possible
enforcement of the almost capricious and arbitrary standards set by
the FCPA.34 5 Commentators have suggested the principles based
tests for the UKBA will encounter the same problems.34 6
340 See Irina Sivachenko, Corporate Victims of 'Victimless Crime': How the FCPA's
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages
Compliance, B.C. L. REv. 393, 393-413 (2012); see also Jennifer Taylor, Ambiguities in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs ofFighting Corruption, 61 LA. L.
REv. 861, 861-86 (2001).
341 In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838, 2004 WL
1267922 (June 9, 2004).
342 In re The Dow Chem. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55281, 2007 WL 460872
(Feb. 13, 2007); SEC v. Dow Chem. Co., Litigation Release No. 20000, 2007 WL
460874 (Feb. 13, 2007).
343 Id.
344 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B) (2000).
345 See Cheryl Evans, The Case for More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability:
Where Do We Go From Here, 41 STETSON L. REV. 21, 35 (2011).
346 Id.
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We do not think that the LegCo should consider requiring the
same principles-based approach requiring corporations to have
"adequate procedures" like the approach adopted by U.S. and U.K.
legislators. First, unlike in the United States, Hong Kong
legislators and law enforcement bodies are much less comfortable
with imposing sanctions on companies based on a balance of
probabilities than their U.S. colleagues. We see few enforcement
actions for violation of section 7 of the UKBA as evidence of this
reticence (which Hong Kong's institutions have inherited). 347
Second, the Hong Kong Department of Justice does not have the
same kind of resources the United States and United Kingdom
have to empirically define an "adequate procedures" test.3 4 8 In the
United States, such a test has been notoriously and ambiguously
applied by Department of Justice officials, and has changed
significantly overtime.34 9 The United Kingdom-despite Guidance
on adequate procedures issued by Ministry of Justice-has yet to
test the Guidance in actual cases (as of this writing). 3 0 Third,
fewer of Hong Kong's largest companies have the ability to
impose anti-corruption conditions on their business partners than
their U.S. or U.K. counterparts. The largest Hong Kong
companies-like Hutchison Whampoa-rank almost 300 on the
Fortune Global 500.31' Compared with their larger colleagues,
they would have much less negotiating power of suppliers and
other partners.
XI. Public Disclosures and Transparency as Anti-Corruption
Measure
Reporting practices represent an important anti-corruption
business measure.35 2 We have already presented data showing the
extent to which companies that report extensively on their
corporate activities (and on their anti-corruption activities as well)
347 See Bribery Act, supra note 49, at § 7.
348 See Thomas R. Fox, Mi FCPA and Briberv Act Musings Continue, FCPA COMPLIANCE AND ElHICS BLOG (Apr. 28.
2013, 7:16 PM). https://tfoxlaw.word
press.com/catcgory/bribery-act/adcquatc-procedures/.
349 See id.
350 See id. at § 9.
351 Global 500 2014, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/global500 (last visited Oct. 24,
2014).
352 David Hess, Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT'L L. 42, 50-51 (2012).
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engage in less corruption.3 "3 However, corporate transparency and
reporting would represent a contentious area of anti-corruption
work. Transparency can jeopardize a company's competitive
position where much of its action and strategy must be done away
from the eyes of its competitors. 35 As such, unilateral
transparency (the company reports transparently without legal
requirements) is unlikely. Only industry standards and/or legal
norms could encourage such transparency.
Hess has proposed one method for improving transparency in
corporate transactions. 5 Echoing proposals made by the former
U.S. SEC General Counsel, he suggests that prosecutors take into
account the degree of public disclosure of a company's activities
during non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements.5 In
order to promote a level playing field, public disclosures would
contain a description of the corporation's compliance program,
including its code of conduct, training policies, and monitoring
practices. 5 To address concerns about the need for privacy, in
order to maintain a company's competitive advantage, some
disclosures could remain exclusively private (only to
government).5 Some of these disclosures may include lists of
specific projects in foreign countries, their budgets, information
about joint venture partners and local agents' contracting terms. 3 59
Such private information-if provided quickly during the initial
stages of an investigation-could increase the probability that a
company escapes from further investigatory and/or prosecutorial
action (at least by the SEC).36
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the U.N. Global
Compact represent two standards that will likely set the bar for
353 See supra Part III.
354 Frederick Lehmann & Ana T. Tavares-Lehmann, Transparency and Inward
Investment Incentives, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSPARENCY 304,312 (Jens Forssbaeck & Lars Oxelheim eds., 2014).
355 Hess, supra note 352, at 65.
356 Doty cites the former SEC General Counsel. See James Doty, Toward a Reg.
FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 62 Bus. LAW. 1233, 1234 (2007).
357 Id. at 1236-37.
358 Id. at 1246-47.
359 Id. at 1246.
360 Id- at 1246-47.
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such reporting."' In Figure 21a, we show the recommended
disclosures that companies (including Hong Kong companies)
might make under the GRI scheme.362 As shown, the qualitative
analysis companies can conduct under the GRI standard leaves
much to be desired. Companies can describe-in as much or little
detail as they like-their anti-corruption policies." They do not
need to describe any actual cases or enforcement actions
pending.36 4
Figure 21a: The Global Reporting Initiative and Public
Disclosure as a Measure to Reduce Corruption
GRI reports represent analyses conducted by companies themselves
about (among other things) their anti-corruption business measures.
They describe the corporation's general managerial approach toward
corruption and self-reported performance in several economic,
environmental, and social categories. Work on anti-corruption falls into
the social category, and three "core" indicators help gauge a company's
performance on anti-corruption policies and practices.
The reporting corporation must disclose:
(1) what business units it has analyzed for corruption risks;
(2) the training provided to employees on the corporation's anti-
corruption policies; and
(3) how the company has responded to any incidents of corruption
related to its business activities.
Related to reporting on its anti-corruption policies and practices, the
company should disclose its operational responsibilities, and its
monitoring procedures.
361 Both the GRI and the Global Compact represent voluntary agreements that
organizations (not countries) agree to. Hong Kong has only five organizations that have
signed on to the Global Compact. See United Nations, Global Compact Participant
Search, available at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search?utf8= / &
commit-Search&keyword=hong+kong&joined after-=&joinedbefore=&business type=
all&sectorid=&listingstatus id=all&copstatus=all&organization type id=&commit-
Search&sort by-country name&direction=ASC.
362 GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, INDICATOR PROTOCOLS SET SOCIETY (2006),
available at https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Society-Indicator-
Protocol.pdf.
363 Id.
364 Id.
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Source: Hess, supra note 352, at 58.
The U.N. Global Compact, however, asks for an extremely
extensive set of information. 3 Principle 10 of the Compact
covers 22 points of a company's anti-corruption policy,
implementation and evaluation. 366 Figure 21b shows the
information that companies should report on. The U.N. considers
only seven of the reporting measures mandatory, with the other
fourteen measures "desired." 36' The U.N. publishes reports
showing best practice in reporting on these anti-corruption
measures.3 68 The report does not highlight the experience of any
Hong Kong companies. Instead, the report focuses on specific
practices from companies like the U.K. Royal Institutions of
Chartered Surveyors, the anti-virus software company Symantec,
Kenya Power, and Alcatel-Lucent.3 69 The U.N. provides no model
reports by companies covering all the points listed in Figure 21b.
The lack of reports suggests these reporting requirements pose too
great a regulatory burden.
Nevertheless, many of the items listed in Figure 21b comprise
reporting obligations for companies wishing to list on the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") or foreign markets. 370
Specifically, a company's listing must have a publicly stated
commitment to work against corruption and other forms of crime
and fraud in its annual report. 37 As part of their normal
management and audit functions, listed companies must also carry
out risk assessment of potential areas of corruption and enact
policies for dissuading corruption and other forms of crime.372
365 U.N. Global Compact (July 26, 2000), https://www.unglobalcompact
.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
366 U.N. Global Compact Principle 10 (July 26, 2000), https://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principlel0.html.
367 U.N. Global Compact, Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle Against
Corruption (2009), available at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues-doc/Anti-
Corruption/UNGCAntiCorruptionReporting.pdf.
368 U.N. Global Compact, Global Compact for the 10th Principle: Corporate
Sustainability with Integrity (2012), available at https://www.unglobal
compact.org/docs/issues-doc/Anti-Corruption/GC-for-the10th-Principle.pdf.
369 Id.
370 NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A. 10 (2013).
371 Id.
372 Id.
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Companies must monitor anti-corruption work under Exchange
rules."'
We recommend that the Hong Kong Exchange consider the
same listing requirements as those found on the NYSE and other
exchanges as a way to help promote the adoption of the U.N.
Global Compact reporting standards. 374 We recommend this
approach for three reasons. First, as we already described, a
statutory or regulatory approach to forced anti-corruption reporting
may impose an undesirable regulatory burden on some of Hong
Kong's companies. Second, the voluntary reporting norms
promulgated by the United Nations have gotten little traction in the
business community at large. Third, listing requirements
"replicate" the voluntary norms contained in the Global Compact.
Each of the Global Compact's twenty-two points corresponds to
one or more NYSE listing requirements to some degree.3" Thus,
instead of imposing another set of reporting requirements, listing
requirements would effectively make the U.N.'s voluntary norms
compulsory.
Figure 21b: The U.N. Global Compact and Public Disclosure
as a Measure to Reduce Corruption
1 0 th Principle Guidance (* means desired)
COMMITMENT & POLICY
1 Publicly stated commitment to work against corruption in all its forms,
including bribery and extortion
2 Commitment to be in compliance with all relevant laws, including anti-
corruption laws
3* Publicly stated formal policy of zero-tolerance of corruption
4* Statement of support for international and regional legal frameworks,
such as the UN Convention against Corruption
5* Carrying out risk assessment of potential areas of corruption
6* Detailed policies for high-risk areas of corruption
7* Policy on anti-corruption regarding business partners
IMPLEMENTATION
373 Id. at § 3.
374 See id.
375 Id.
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I Translation of the anti-corruption commitment into actions
2 Support by the organization's leadership for anti-corruption
3 Communication and training on the anti-corruption commitment for all
employees
4 Internal checks and balances to ensure consistency with the anti-
corruption commitment
5* Actions taken to encourage business partners to implement anti-
corruption commitments
6* Management responsibility and accountability for implementation of
the anticorruption commitment or policy
7* Human Resources procedures supporting the anti-corruption
commitment or policy
8* Communications (whistleblowing) channels and follow-up
mechanisms for reporting concerns or seeking advice
9* Internal accounting and auditing procedures related to anticorruption
10* Participation in voluntary anti-corruption initiatives
MONITORING
1 Monitoring and improvement processes
2* Leadership review of monitoring and improvement results
3* Dealing with incidents
4* Public legal cases regarding corruption
5* Use of independent external assurance of anti-corruption programs
Source: Hess, supra note 352, at 60.
Instead of changing listing requirements outright, the
government should convoke an ad hoc, tripartite commission to
consider the issue. The managers of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange would not seriously consider these listing requirements
if the matter were left to them. They represent the short-term
interests of their members, rather than the broader social good. On
the other hand, a government-only study would not adequately
incorporate the preferences of NGOs and other potential users of
company anti-corruption reports. We thus follow international
best practice and recommend consideration by a commission that
would include representatives from business, government and civil
society."7 The commission should only come together to consider
376 See generally ORG. ECON. CooP. DEV., CIVIL SOCIETY EMPOWERMENT (draft,
2013) (discussing policies that promote cooperation among NGOs, corporations, and
governments), available at http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/CivilSocietyEmpowerment
Draft.pdf; Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES AND PROGRAMS: A
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the issue of listing-related anti-corruption reporting. In that way,
we would not create another costly permanent bureaucratic
structure.
XII. Anti-Corruption Education and Training
Recent innovations in U.S. and U.K. law practically make anti-
corruption training for corporate directors and managers a
statutory requirement. Under U.S. federal prosecutors' guidelines
for prosecuting and charging corporations, prosecutors may
consider a company's compliance and training programs in
deciding whether to bring charges or otherwise resolve an alleged
violation." For Huskins, such training should address five points
in order to minimize the probability of corruption and maximize its
qualifications for prosecutorial lenience. 37 These five points
provide lessons for other companies-like companies from Hong
Kong-looking to deal with anti-corruption provisions coming into
force worldwide. 7' As these five points have been relatively
"tried-and-true," with many exceptions which we will describe
below, Hong Kong companies looking to comply with possible
future POBO "duty to prevent corruption" provisions may look to
these points.3 so
The first three aspects of a company's anti-corruption training
should deal with making the training specific to the company."'
First, to what extent does the training set the right tone by senior
managements about the firm's culture of compliance? Such
training helps assure staff that they do not have the tacit consent of
management for engaging in bribery and/or other corrupt
behaviors.382 Second, is the written policy (and training about that
policy) practical and specific? Such training should provide
specific guidance about the situations or moral dilemmas
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION (2000) (discussing empirical evaluations of various
approaches to fighting corruption).
377 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL Cap. 9 § 28.100 et seq., 2008 WL 5999732, 1 (2008).
378 See Priya Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1447 (2008).
379 See id.
380 See id.
381 See id. at 1453.
382 Id. at 1453-54.
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employees will most likely confront. 38 In that way, the
company's directors can credibly claim at trial that they prohibited
bribery in the situation for which prosecutors target their company.
Third, has the company focused its training on the specific risks
faced by its staff in the relevant jurisdictions? According to
Huskins, Transparency International provides relatively reliable
data about the extent of corruption risks faced by companies
operating in various jurisdictions.3 84 Companies can use data like
this-and specifically the experiences of its field staff-to tailor
training to that company's specific needs."'
The next two features of anti-corruption training deal with the
breadth of that training. First, is training mandatory and
periodically updated? Mandatory training means that employees
cannot use ignorance of the law as a defense."' Second, can
employees easily obtain guidance on following the company's
FCPA compliance program? If employees have numerous
resources, they cannot claim that they had no recourse to advice.
Combined, these 5 points attempt to minimize the potential
vicarious liability of the corporate principal(s) for the acts of its
agents. 8 Because the common law system provides ample room
for agents to attempt to impute liability for their actions on their
principals, training provides an important shield in the corporate
armor aimed at minimizing corporate liability for corruption."
Companies often use training as a core component of their
compliance programs, particularly after DOJ enforcement actions.
Koehler (2012) reports that Siemens trained 300,000 employees
worldwide on FCPA compliance procedures after its settlement
with the DOJ. "9 Comverse Technology serves as a common
example of the way that training figures into a DOJ settlement.3*
383 Id. at 1454.
384 See Huskins, supra note 378, at 1455
385 Id., at 1454.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 1455-56.
388 Id.
389 Mike Koehler, Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
Wisc. L. REv. 609,615 (2012).
390 See Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't Justice &
Lorretta E. Lynch, Ass't U.S. Att'y, E.D.N.Y, to Daniel J. Horwitz, Att'y for Comverse
Tech. (Apr. 6, 2011) (documenting non-prosecution agreement), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-comverse/04-06-l 1 comverse-
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In its non-prosecution agreement with the DoJ, the company
promised, among other things, to train individuals associated with
the company (including third-parties) on its anti-corruption
policies."' Such a requirement had the effect of forcing Comverse
Technology to train foreign parties about U.S. laws because, as the
settlement insinuates, Comverse employees and managers
probably had no knowledge of payments made by their Israeli
agent to government officials.392 The cases against Watts Water
Technologies and Lucent Technologies specifically cite the failure
to train partners as a reason for DOJ enforcement action.' In the
Tyson and Maxwell deferred prosecution agreements, the DOJ
required annual certifications attesting to the training on the FCPA
of all key company staff and business partners.39 4
The UKBA promises to increase the importance of training as
part of a company's anti-corruption compliance and defense
strategy. ' The Act specifically requires companies to have
"adequate procedures" (as we have discussed several times),
which explicitly includes training.396 While most U.K. firms have
these adequate procedures, fewer have training on these
procedures.' 9 According to a recent survey, 91% of U.K. firms
have adequate procedures, but only 53% have adequate training
about those adequate procedures. 39 Training represents a core
compliance strategy, yet one many companies even in the U.K.
npa.pdf.
391 Id. at 1-4.
392 Id.
393 See generally Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In the Matter of
Watts Water Techs. and Leesen Chang, SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-
14585 (2011) (alleging that Chang, the general manager of Chinese partner firm, bribed
managers in Chinese state-owned enterprises to win contracts and that "Watts failed to
conduct adequate FCPA training for its employees in China until July 2009").
394 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 20-23, United States v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., No. I 1-CR-037-RWR (D. D.C. Feb. 10, 2011). See also Deferred Prosecution
Agreement 29-34, United States v. Maxwell Techs., No. I 1-CR-329-JM (S.D. Cal. Jan.
31, 2011).
395 See Bribery Act, supra note 49, at § 9.
396 Id.
397 See KPMG, Doing Business Under the UK Bribery Act Survey 2012, available at
http://www.kpmg.com/in/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pages/uk-bribery-
act.aspx.
398 Id.
430 Vol. XL
2015 ICAC AND COMPANY ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS
have not implemented. 39 9 Hong Kong's legislators will need to
think about more than a statutory admonition to have anti-
corruption training in order for more Hong Kong companies to
engage in such training.
Hong Kong companies have more than enough training
materials at their disposal, even if 67% of Hong Kong's companies
they do not use them.4" Figure 22 shows some of the many
manuals the anti-corruption agency offers to private businesses
looking to train their staff on preventing corruption. The ICAC
offers more educational and training materials than most other
anti-corruption agencies covering jurisdictions of its size (or much
larger). 401' The mismatch between the supply and demand (namely
use) of these programs suggests improper social marketing. Hong
Kong's companies do not need more manuals and guidance-they
need incentives in order to use them.
Figure 22: The ICAC Has Covered Hong Kong With How-To
Anti-Corruption Manuals
General Integrity - The Key to Business Success
Insurance "The Noble Means" Practical Guide on Professional Ethics for
Sector Life Insurance Intermediaries
Estate 'Integrity in Estate Agency Transactions' A Joint EAA and
Agency ICAC Publication for Estate Agency Practitioners
Trade
Travel and 'Integrity - Our Winning Edge' A Practical Guide for the
Tourism Travel and Tourism Industry
Industry
Handling Guideline on Secure Handling of Customers' Credit Card Data
of Credit
Card Data
Telecoms Code of Practice on Protection of Customer Information for
Industry Fixed and Mobile Service Operators
399 See id.
400 See KPMG, FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT SURVEY IN HONG KONG(2006)
(corroborating the present authors' data on Hong Kong companies' relatively limited use
of codes of conduct and ethics-training programs), available at http://www.kpmg.
com.cn/en/virtual library/Financialadvisory_services/2006fraudSurvey.pdf.
401 For many countries, businesses rely primarily on the generic-and
expensive-ICC manual. See ICC, FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A CORPORATE PRACTICES
MANUAL, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/areas-of-
work/corporate-responsibility-and-anti-corruption/ICC-Fighting-Corruption-Handbook.
431
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
SMEs Integrity & Compliance with the Law: A Guide to the
Prevention of Corruption for SME Entrepreneurs Investing in
Guangdong & Hong Kong, Corruption Prevention Kit on
Cross-Boundary Business
Constructi Managing Integrity and Striving for Excellence - Corruption
on Prevention Package for Construction Industry
Industry
Profession Ethics in Practice - E-Learning Packages for Construction-
als related Professionals
Financial A Tool Kit on Managing Staff Integrity for Financial Services
Services Sector, Ethics in Practice - A Practical Guide for Bank
Sector Managers, Ethics in Practice - A Practical Guide for Financial
Practitioners, 'Sunshine Training Camp' On-line Training
Package for Bank Staff (CD-ROM)
Ethics Defining and Developing an Effective Code of Conduct for
Promotion Organizations, "Ethics - The Core Value of Leadership"
Toolkit on Directors' Ethics, Health Checklist on Corporate
Ethics Program, "Integrity - The key to Business Success"
Information Pack for Foreign Investors, Business Ethics -
Your Way to Success, Corruption Prevention Training
Package for Front-line Staff of Business Sector (CD-ROM)
Source: See HONG KONG ICAC, http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Yet, the data do not suggest that the POBO should provide the
same very aggressive standards to companies as the FCPA and the
UKBA. Empirically, little evidence suggests that anti-corruption
training reduces the propensity for taking bribes. Dormaels and
Vande Walle (2012) find, using a statistical sample of anti-
corruption training evaluations, that only about 10% of
participants found such trainings "useful on a daily basis." 0 2
The majority of participants (over 50%) found training on
corruption legislation, methods of "disarming" corruption, and
role-playing particularly unhelpful.4 03 The most "useful" type of
training consisted of training on gifts procedures, and only 66%
found this "occasionally useful" or useful more often." In a more
rigorous study, Professors Healy and Serafeim (2012) find that
companies that have extensive training and disclosure programs
tend to have statistically significantly less future public corruption
402 See Ame Dormaels & Gudrun Vande Walle, Preventing Corruption: Lessons
Learned from Anti-Corruption Training for Belgian Customs and Excise Officers, 5
WORLD CUSTOMS J. 2 (2011).
403 See id. at 37.
404 Id.
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scandals. 405 In another recent study, Professors loannou and
Serafeim find that training and codes of conduct reduce bribery by
firms, but only when coupled with strong law enforcement and
other factors.406 These results imply that training, when coupled
with stronger corporate measures and preferably a previous
scandal, tends to reduce corruption.
Given the relatively low effectiveness of the ICAC's marketing
of its training materials (and the uncertain effects of such training
on corruption),we recommend against adding FCPA and UKBA
style provisions which make anti-corruption training almost a
mandatory "tick" in the box of measures companies must take.
Instead, we recommend that the ICAC provide this training
through local NGOs. We recommend that the ICAC set up a
grants scheme for NGOs offering the most useful and/or
innovative training.
The Government should use an NGO grant scheme, rather than
spending even more resources on over-supplied training, for four
reasons. First, international donors like USAID and the World
Bank have found these the best practice schemes to fund training
(instead of providing direct funding to the government agency
responsible for preventing corruption) very effective.407 Second,
as we will describe below, the ICAC Ethics Development Centre
has had teething problems. These problems suggest the Centre is
only at the beginning stages of learning how to teach ethics, rather
than having an undisputed competency in this area. 4 08 Third,
outside of the ICAC, far fewer resources exist to prevent
corruption than in other countries. The U.S. and E.U. have vibrant
markets for ethics training by NGOs and law professionals.40 9 In
Hong Kong, the ICAC dominates ethics training (as we have
already described).4 10 While such an approach may have served
Hong. Kong well in the later part of the 2 0 th century, international
best practice has moved on. Fourth, as we describe below, the
405 Paul Healy & George Serafeim, Causes and Consequences of Firn Disclosures
ofAnticorruption Efforts, HARV. Bus. ScH. WORKING PAPER 12-077 (2012).
406 loannis loannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory
Corporate Sustainability Reporting, (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. I1-100, 2011).
407 See Huther & Shah, supra note 376.
408 See infra Section XIII.
409 See Nuno Gamupa, Globalization and Deregulation ofLegal Services, INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 11 (forthcoming).
410 See Figure 22.
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Ethics Development Centre should be independent from the
ICAC.4 1' The management should not be ICAC staff, nor depend
on ICAC funding. With its newfound independence, the grants
scheme will be one source for finance for this new non-profit
organization.
XIII. Reforming the ICAC's Ability to Promote Corporate
Ethics
The ICAC continues to serve as one of the most successful
models for an anti-corruption agency. Anti-corruption practitioners
worldwide cite the ICAC's community engagement programs as
models in the field.412 The Commission has clearly succeeded in
ensuring low levels of corruption in Hong Kong.413 However, the
data suggest that the ICAC plays a far less effective role in
providing adequate training and ethics-related guidance to Hong
Kong business than its foreign peers in their jurisdictions.
The new Hong Kong Ethics Development Centre provides an
important forum for helping companies to develop ethics
programs.4 15 However, the Centre lags behind its comparators in
terms of engaging with the public, affecting the probable success
of any revisions to the POBO aimed at encouraging businesses to
adopt measures aimed at fighting corruption. 416 Figure 23 shows
announcements made by the EDC from 2010 to September 2012.
Announcements came, on average, about every two months. Yet,
roughly half of these announcements consisted of non-training or
core related activities. For example, the most recent announcement
(that business executives should attend the Annual Corporate and
Regulatory Update organized by corporate secretaries) does not
provide information useful for improving an organization's
411 See infra Section XIII.
412 See generally Jon Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: The Difference
between Success and Failure, Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on
Public Management in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges (2010) (analyzing
the extent to which community-relations programs have actually helped to reduce
corruption), available at http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cfred/download/Quah
%20Macau%20Conference%2OPape&/o2020I 0.pdf.
413 See id.
414 See text accompanying note 200.
415 See Mission, HONG KONG ETHICs DEV. CTR., http://www.hkedc.icac.hk/english
/aboutus/mission.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
416 See Figure 23.
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ethics. 417 Other activities, particularly in 2010, publicize the
Centre without specific mention of its achievements in improving
ethics in Hong Kong's companies.
Figure 23: The Ethics Development Centre Has Had a
Difficult Start
(news items in grey not actual events)
2012/04/19 The Centre encourages business Advertisement
executives and professionals to
attend ACRU 2012
2011/10/27 Seminar on UK Bribery Act and Small 1.5 hour
Doing Business with the United
Kingdom
"briefing" without
eneasement
2011/08/29 "Integrity and Professionalism - Not directly relevant
Key to Business Success" to ethics
Conference for SMEs in
Guangdong, Hong Kong and
Macao
2011/07/11 The Centre encourages Not directly relevant
companies and directors to
participate in the "Directors of
The Year Awards 2011"
2011/05/03 The Centre encourages business only as advertisement
executives and professionals to for another
attend ACRU 2011 professional
association event
2011/01/24 The Centre Offered Summer Not news
Internships to University
Students
2010/12/10 Lunch to bid farewell to retiring Not "news one can
EDAC members and welcome use"
new members
2010/09/21 The 10th Issue of "ICAC Post" Self-promotion piece
Released rather than useful
news
2010/08/12 The Centre's 15th Anniversary Self-promotion rather
I _than actual
417 See Agenda 15 Annual Corporate and Regulatory Update (ACRU) 2014
http://app.norrayhk.com/acru20l4/MO2_agenda.asp (indicating no agenda topics related
to ethics)
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achievements
2010/06/18 The Centre encourages Cheerleading
companies and directors to
participate in the "Directors of
The Year Awards 2010"
2010/04/26 Anti-Corruption Update
2010/04/13 The Centre encourages business Cheerleading
executives and professionals to
attend ACRU 2010
2010/03/29 Issue 9 of the Centre's E- Useful announcement
Newsletter Released of news (but not the
news itself)
2010/03/16 The Latest Issue of "ICAC Post" Useful announcement
Released of news (but not the
news itself)
2010/01/25 Close Cooperation with
Professional Bodies
Source: See News, HONG KONG ETHICS DEVELOPMENT CENTRE,
http://www.hkedc.icac.hk/english/newsevents/news-events.php?news=1 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Other ethics organizations worldwide offer a useful contrast to
the Centre for Ethics Development. The U.S.-based Ethics
Resource Center serves as one of many examples.4 18 Figure 24
shows the recent news items of the Ethics Resource Center, and
provides analysis of the way the Center adopts a "social
marketing" approach. On their website, they announce regular
events that engage with businesses and provide support to ethics
trainers alike.4 19 For example, the first event-announcing the
results of a survey about whistleblower retaliation-takes a strong
social marketing approach.420 Readers of the news can use these
data directly, both to frame their own compliance programs and as
evidence related to the general policy environment. 421 The news
attracts the attention of the reader as an issue directly relevant in
their everyday work experience.4 22 Unlike the guidance given by
418 See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ethics.org (last visited Sep. 12,
2014).
4 I9 id.
420 Id.
421 See id.
422 See id.
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the ICAC, the ERC guidance provides specific examples and
support with actual cases rather than hypothetical cases. 42 3
Figure 24: Ethics Resource Center Shows How Poorly CED
is Managed
(bold indicates news item, normal text represents our comments)
Date Event
4 Retaliation Against Whistleblowers Rising Faster than
September Reporting, Ethics Resource Center Reports Study Shows
2012 Companies With Strong Programs Reduce Retaliation
ERC provides "news you can use," namely objective data on
whistleblowing and policy recommendations for companies and
government.
24 July Ethics Resource Center Releases Findings on Workplace
2012 Misconduct at Fortune 500 Companies
Findings represent a way to keep the topic interesting and the
business sector involved.
31 May Just What is a Whistleblower? Ethics Resource Center
2012 Report Challenges Traditional View, Says Whistleblower is
not a Rogue Employee Most Whistleblowers Report
Concerns.to Employers before Going Outside of the
Company with Concerns
The news fits into a "stream" of news and events about
whistleblowing. This gives the Center's work coherence and
longevity.
1 May Blue-Ribbon Report Says Corporate Ethics Would Improve
2012 with Changes to Sentencing Guidelines Implementation To
Mark Milestone for Groundbreaking Law, ERC Advisory
Group Calls for Greater Consistency by Enforcement
Agencies
Shows an independence from government-something the EDC
needs before being a credible interlocutor for business.
13 March Former TI-USA Leader Boswell Joins ERC Board of
2012 Directors
Old style press release (not every Center is perfect).
13 March Experts See Impact of SEC Whistleblower Provisions. The
2012 whistleblower provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act raise a host
of new questions for business leaders.
Provides a forum for deciding future business responses to a new
piece of legislation.
12 January Patricia Ellis of Raytheon is First Recipient of ERC's Carol
2012 R. Marshall Award Ellis Leads Raytheon's Ethics and
Compliance Efforts, Developed Innovative Ethics Education
423 id
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The announcement is about Patricia Ellis, but the story provides
lots of news the reader can use about Raytheon's compliance
program.
9 January Leading Ethics Research Organization Wants Social
2012 Networkers to Provide Insight & Questions
Brings up cutting edge issue of social media and the ethical
issues involved in using social media. The topic is hot and
relevant to the business community.
5 January New Research: 2011 National Business Ethics Survey. New
2012 Research: 45 Percent Of U.S. Employees Observed
Misconduct; Highest Levels Of Whistleblowing, But More
Than One In Five Whistleblowers Experienced Retaliation
Links the survey with a webinar to cover the law related to issues
covered in the survey. Their work is critical of current
approaches (by both business and government), and thus relevant
and useful to both sectors.
Source: See News, ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, http://ethics.org/media/news
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
We think the large difference in performance between the EDC
and other ethics advisory bodies (like the Ethics Resource Center)
stem from its affiliation with the ICAC. The Centre is a non-profit
organization "established under the auspices of the Community
Relations Department of the ICAC." 4 24 The Centre has a staff of
two persons: Monica Yu (Executive Director) and Lawrence
Chung (Deputy Executive Director).42 5 We found no evidence that
these individuals have engaged in the grueling in-firm training that
their colleagues in other ethics training organizations abroad do.426
The EDC has a similar mandate to the ERC, to "offer client-
focused services to cater for specific needs."4 27  However, the
website does not make clear what those needs are, or how the EDC
caters to them. 428 EDC clearly adopts the ICAC's risk-averse
approach to dealing with the public.4 29 While such risk-aversion
may have protected the Commission and its staff in the past,
keeping the Center as part of the ICAC would do more harm than
good.
424 About Us, HONG KONG ETHICs DEV. CTR., http://www.hkedc.icac.hk/english/
aboutus/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
425 Id.
426 See id.
427 HONG KONG ETHICs DEV. CTR., http://www.icac.org.hk/hkedc/eng/about_1.
html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
428 See id.
429 See id.
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The EDC's Board of Advisors should also be reorganized to
provide actual competencies in ethics rather than support for the
ICAC's work from the business sector. At present, the EDC
Board represents several of the major business associations,
including the Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association, the
American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, the Chinese
General Chamber of Commerce, and others. 430 The profile
suggests a prestige board rather than a working board. In
contrast, one of the major proponents of U.S. whistleblowing
legislation, former Rep. Michael Oxley, heads the ERC.432 Seven
ERC Board Members come from law firms, while four come from
large business and three from ethics related trade or academic
associations.43 3 Most of the U.S.'s ERC board members earn at
least part of their salary from daily ethics related consulting and
advice giving. Such experience provides the ERC with a
knowledge of ethics that the generalist business ties of the Hong
Kong's EDC cannot match.4 35
Once the ICAC has a clear mandate to engage in the same
hard-hitting ethics development work (through its independence
and new managerial outlook), the Centre should actively work
with local businesses associations and businesses to adopt anti-
corruption compliance programs. The Centre may benefit from
financing from the grants scheme we proposed previously.
However, the break from the ICAC's risk-averse institutional
culture-combined with the need to raise its own funds through
market offerings-should increase the number and scope of its
training programs.
If the ICAC wishes to continue providing support to the EDC,
two avenues may crowd in (rather than crowd out) other work.
First, we have mentioned that the ICAC can provide funds through
grant programs open to all organizations (for which the EDC
would need to compete). Second, the ICAC may work with the
430 Advisory Committee, HONG KONG ETHICs DEV. CTR., http://www.hkedc.icac.
hk/english/aboutus/advisorycommittee.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
431 See id.
432 Board Members, ETHICS RES. CTR., http://www.ethics.org/page/board-members
(last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
433 Id.
434 See id.
435 id
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EDC to engage in any post-enforcement monitoring or advice. In
the United States, companies often retain legal counsel to provide
advice on business measures that might qualify for prosecutorial
lenience under a monitorship or other arrangement. 436 To avoid
the criticisms of the U.S. approach-and to encourage the
development of a market for anti-corruption advice-the ICAC
should provide advice to NGOs, private companies and the new
(and completely independent) EDC. In this way, the ICAC could
reach far more companies through these intermediaries than trying
to educate Hong's Kong's business single-handedly.
Reorganizing the Ethics Development Centre (currently under
ICAC "auspices") will directly affect the likely success of the
revisions we propose to the POBO, which encourage businesses to
adopt anti-corruption measures. First, if the POBO does offer
defenses against corporate liability for corruption, then advisors
should be ready to provide advice on such adequate procedures, to
use the UKBA's language. Companies attempting to comply with
similar defenses available under U.S. law struggled because of the
lack of such advice.4 37 By allowing the EDC to respond to
corporate needs, reform of the EDC would directly affect the
success of revisions to the POBO. Second, if the POBO will apply
to transactions outside of Hong Kong, the ICAC must encourage
greater self-enforcement by Hong Kong's businesses themselves.
We have presented data showing that Hong Kong's companies'
policies are not adequate to engage in such self-policing. Having a
strong and independent EDC would provide these companies with
a valuable resource.
XIV. Conclusions
In this paper, we have looked at many of the standard business
measures adopted by companies for preventing and addressing
corruption. We have seen how legislation, particularly in the
United States, has provided companies with incentives to
undertake many of these measures. We have reviewed the
common measures adopted by businesses worldwide to tackle
corruption-including internal policies and procedures, codes of
conduct, accounting and auditing standards, education and other
measures. We also showed that Hong Kong's legislative
436 See supra Section IX.
437 See id.
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framework fails to provide many of the incentives provided by
other systems for companies to tackle corruption. We have argued
for several changes to the POBO and other regulations aimed at
promoting integrity in Hong Kong's commercial activity
(particularly abroad).

